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SEOUL PAPER COMMENTS ON CONSTITUTION REVISIONS

SK140220 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English 14 Mar 80 p 2 SK

[Editorial: "Constitutional Revision"]

[Text] The constitution of this young republic has been revised on seven occasion since the founding of the government on 15 August 1948, three years after the dramatic emancipation of this country from the yoke of alien colonialists.

This may well indicate the thorny path of this republic since the national liberation that had come, not by ourselves but by the external power in world politics then.

In the wake of the recent political upheaval resulting from the assassination of former President Pak Chong-hui, however, we have seen debate on constitutional revision in this country is going on more vigorously than in any previous days.

This apparently shows that people from all walks of life, as well as politicians regardless of their partisan affiliations, are all the more anxious for the advent of the nation's master law designed to reflect their wishes for democratization in all sectors.

The enthusiasm for constitutional revision toward political democratization that can be discerned among people as a whole these days undoubtedly shows the national consensus to that effect.

Wishes for constitutional revision may vary according to individual people on different footings.

For this reason, the work on systematizing the problems related to different arguments concerned will be difficult and hard work.

Nevertheless, the government, politicians and all leading personages in society should not fail to most faithfully and energetically reflect the real wishes of the people based on democratic principles before reaching a satisfactory accord on constitutional revision.

By doing so, we should pass the revised constitution down to the following generation as a basic law of the nation that can be respected and highly evaluated by the people of this country long in the future in the process of making democratic politics take root in our society.

President Choe Kyu-ha has formally inaugurated a government constitution revision deliberation committee with 68 leaders from various segments in society as its members.

This specific body will embark on its business under direct presidential jurisdiction following an inaugural session to be held today.

Chaired by Premier Sin Hyon-hwak, the newly-established committee will convene its sessions once a week on a regular basis, with former New Democratic Party head Yu Chin-o as special advisor.

It is our sincere hope that those designated committee members will not fail to pool their wisdom and democratic awareness in efforts to map out the government version of the constitutional revision.

Problems concerning constitutional revision will have to be handled by experts and scholars.

Yet, many things can be decided based on the common sense of the people regarding whether the new constitution upholds social justice and respects the basic rights of all citizens.

Therefore, the widespread voice among the people have to be respected more than any sophisticated theory, depending upon specific matters in this connection.

So as to weigh closely the true wishes of the people, politicians, experts and other social leaders will have to listen to the popular voices honestly and constantly through all available channels.

CSO: 4120

BRIEFS

UNEMPLOYMENT FIGURES--Seoul, 5 Mar (OP-KYODO)--South Korea's unemployed population jumped 22.6 per cent last year over 1978's level, raising the jobless rate from 3.2 per cent to 3.8 per cent, according to Economic Planning Board statistics released Wednesday. The statistics showed that the jobless numbered 542,000 as of the end of last year, up 100,000 from a year before, while the employed population totaled 13.7 million, an increase of only 1.3 per cent over the end of 1978. The trend was attributed to a general business recession last year. The statistics also showed that the country's "economically active population"--which includes the unemployed--increased 2 per cent last year to 14.2 million, while the population 14 years old and over grew 2.7 per cent to 24.7 million. The urban population increased 5.9 per cent, compared to 6.8-per cent growth in 1978 while the rural population decreased 2.8 per cent--vs. a 3.2-per cent drop in the previous year. Some 40 per cent of the work force were in the social overhead and other service businesses, 36 per cent in the agriculture, fishery and forestry sectors, and the remaining 24 per cent in mining and manufacturing. [Text] [Tokyo KYODO in English no time given 5 Mar 80 OW]

CSO: 4120

YOUTH INTRODUCED TO CONCEPT OF CLASS

Pyongyang NODONG CHONGNYON in Korean 2 Feb 80 p 2

[Article: "What Is Class?"]

[Text] The great leader Marshal Kim Il-song has taught as follows:

"We must thoroughly expose among our workers the wicked and treacherous nature of class enemies and cultivate a powerful hostility toward these enemies, and at the same time deeply impress upon the workers the legitimacy of their own class situation and revolutionary struggle, so that all workers may be made to oppose class enemies and resolutely struggle to the end for their class, their party, the socialist fatherland and the victory of the great revolutionary undertaking." ("Collected Works of Kim Il-Song" Vol 8 p 472)

For the maturing new generation of youth, to possess a clear understanding of class and class struggle and a correct position and viewpoint in that regard has become an extremely important problem in preparing them as chuche-type revolutionaries, and in the succession and completion of the great revolutionary undertaking of chuche generation after generation.

Consequently, our "Fundamentals Explanation Lecture" [column] will, starting today and continuing for a time, explain the fundamentals of class and class struggle.

Large groups of people are separated from each other depending upon social position and interests, or what is called class.

There may be numerous people in the society, but among them there will be those whose social position and interests are identical and those whose are not.

In the exploitive society, sovereignity and the means of production are monopolized while others are subordinated and exploited; in the developed exploitive society, there are also those with interests and those who, in contrast, possess neither sovereignity nor the means of production and are subject to the exploitation and coercion of the others, and when the exploitive interests are overthrown, there are still those with interests.

Generally speaking, the large body of people who possess the same social position and interests is called a class.

However, the formation of permancy on the basis of the interests of individuals is a problem which bears on independence.

This problem is a fundamental trait which divides people into various classes.

Classes are divided broadly into the exploiting class or the exploited class, depending on whether they suppress independence or are suppressed.

In the hostile society, the landlords and capitalists are the exploitive class which suppresses the independence of the working masses, and the workers and farmers are the exploited class whose independence is restricted by the landlords and capitalists.

Classes are further broken down into various classes depending on their demands for independence and the extent to which they can fulfill those demands, as well as the degree to which they can suppress such demands and what methods they have for doing so.

In such a society, the two opposing classes which have the most immediate interests in either demanding independence or in suppresssing it are called the basic classes of the society.

Following the appearance of class, human society passed through three types of hostile societies, and in each of these hostile class societies there were two basic classes.

In the slave society there were the slaves and the slave owners; in feudal society, the serfs-peasants and the feudal landlords; and in the capitalist society, the workers and the capitalists. The non-basic classes included the freemen and craftsmen in the slave society, craftsmen and merchants in the feudal society, and landlords and farmers in the capitalist society.

Other elements which also were separated into classes, such as the basic right to guarantee independence and the ownership of property, and the position of people who later occupied such roles in the society, ultimately boiled down to the question of independence.

Today, in socialist societies such as that of our nation, there exist, in terms of class, the working class and the cooperative farmer. The intelligentsia is not a class, but a social stratum.

Classes appeared with the rise of the class society. There were instances of the classless society in human history. In the first primitive societies that appeared after man escaped from the animal world to that of mankind, freedom was at its lowest and every one had the same interests, and that what we call class was not possible. The classless primitive society continued for a long period of time.

As productivity gradually increased surpluses appeared, as did the tendency to wield power over other individuals, and in the end social groupings appeared which, on the basis of interests, were mutually distinct and antagonistic. This was the first form of class.

The first class society to develop in human history was the slave society. The slave society appeared as soon as primitive society collapsed. In the slave society the slaves had their freedom cruelly trampled on, and were even termed "talking tools." In contrast, the slave owners lived lives of luxury while cruelly trampling on the freedom of the slaves and exploiting and coercing them. The slave society collapsed through uprisings by slaves determined to protect their freedom, and in its place appeared feudal society.

The fundamental classes in the feudal society were the feudal landlords and the serfs-peasants. The feudal landlords were no different from slave owners, cruelly trampling on the freedom of the workers and exploiting and coercing them without let up. The only difference was in the method--in contrast to slave-type oppression and exploitation, people were exploited and their freedom crushed through feudal exploitation and social subordination. Thsu feudal society was also destroyed throught he uprising of the serf-peasant populace to gain their independence, and in its place appeared the captialist society.

In the capitalist society, the landlords and capitalists play the role of master and oppress and exploit the working masses, including workers and farmers, using the most refined, perfected, cunning, cruel and vicious methods in history.

The capitalist society has not yet been overthrown by the revolutionary struggle of workers and farmers for their independence.

In the socialist society where the working masses have become the masters of state and society, and where all forms of exploitation and coercion have been eliminated, only workers and cooperative farmers remain as classes. In the completely victorious socialist society, where the three great revolutions of ideology, technology and culture have been vigorously advanced and the rural problem finally solved, class will be permanently eliminated.

Class is thus a historical product of the process of social development, and will gradually disappear in the process of struggle to completely realize independence under the leadership of the working class.

9062
CSO: 4108

MILITARY YOUTH UNDERGO INDOCTRINATION

Pyongyang NODONG CHONGNYON in Korean 2 Feb 80 p 3

[Article: "Let Us Normalize Class Indoctrination Activities"]

[Text] On the scene at Socialist Working Youth League [SWYL] organizations of units of the Korean People's Army and the Korean People's Constabulary....

The great leader Marshal Kim Il-song has taught as follows:

"Class indoctrination of soldiers in the People's Army must be further strengthened."

Holding high the teachings of the great leader, class indoctrination activities among young soldiers in SWYL organizations of People's Army units and People's Constabulary units are being stepped up and normalized.

Class indoctrination meetings.

In the SWYL organization of the Unit to which Comrade Kang Chang-pom is attached of the KPA, class indoctrination activities are being stepped up and organized under the guidance of party organizations so that young soldiers are being better indoctrinated to fight to the end against the eternal enemies of our people--the American occupiers, landlords and capitalists.

In particular, class indoctrination meetings are being organized and normalized in the SWYL organization of this unit, and an effort made to fundamentally and deeply indoctrinate young soldiers.

In conjunction with this, class indoctrination meetings have been held by the SWYL organization of this unit recently, the subjects of which included "To Occupy and Plunder Is the True Nature of Imperialism," "The Intrinsic Nature of Imperialism Never Changes" and "What Is the True Nature of the Exploitive Class?"

A few days ago the class indoctrination meeting entitled "What Is the True Nature of the Exploitive Class?" was held.

By deeply studying the works and programmatic teaching of the great leader on class indoctrination, and through a variety of materials, the young soldiers became fundamentally and more deeply aware that the essence of the landlords and capitalists is to coerce and exploit the working people, and that these sorts cannot exist for even a single day without coercing and exploiting working peoples.

Comrades Yi Song-mo and Kim In-su in particular not only set an example in their studies, but also helped in preparing for the class indoctrination meetings of young soldiers through publication of the problems they studied in a collection called "Class Indoctrination."

Many comrades took part in the discussions at the class indoctrination meetings which had been so well prepared in this manner, and in the process they young soldiers became much more aware of the true nature of the exploitive class and made firm resolutions to fight to the end against these enemies.

Art appreciation and presentation meetings.

At the SWYL organization of the Red Flag Unit of the Korean People's Constabulary to which Comrade So Yong-sam Is Attached, and the SWYL organization of the Twice Red Flag Unit of the KPA to which Comrade Choe Yong-chol Is Attached, art appreciation and presentation meetings are organized frequently which provide life-like representations to the young soldiers.

Not too long ago the SWYL organization of the Red Flag Unit to which Comrade So Yong-sam Is Attached had an art appreciation and presentation meeting for [the painting] "New Year's Day."

At the meeting a number of young soldiers, including SWYL Committee Chairman Comrade Yu Yong-ho, talked about the bitter life of our people in the old days, and reflected on the wretched life of the people in the south who languish under the coercion, oppression and exploitation of our people's eternal enemies, the American occupiers, landlords and capitalists.

In so doing, they firmly resolved to defend, like an impregnable fortress, the results of revolution and our superior socialist system created by the great leader.

Not long ago the SWYL organization of the Twice Red Flag Unit to which Comrade Choe Yong-chol Is Attached held an art appreciation and presentation meeting for [the painting] "Young Farmhand."

Comrades Ho Sang-chol, Paek Kwan-su and Choe Im-chan led the discussion at the meeting, talking about the miserable situation of the young farm boy who, in the driving snow of a cold winter's day, had to pump water from daybreak wearing unlined clothing and straw sandals, and discussed how in the old days our people were exploited and coerced by landlords and capitalists, and how today in the south are coerced and exploited by the American occupiers, landlords and captialists.

Through such a process, the young soldiers became even more firmly resolved to fight to the end in opposition to the American occupiers, landlords and capitalists.

In addition, SWYL organizations at KPA units including the Thrice Red Flag Unit to which Comrade Kim Sand-su Is Attached, the Red Flag Unit to which Comrade Yu Chang-sun Is Attached, and the Red Flag Unit to which Comrade Paek Man-yong Is Attached, using the Art Cell Campaign and television program and photograph explanation meetings, are increasing knowledge about the bitter life of our people before liberation and the living conditions today of people in the south who are enduring a wretched life at the hands of the American occupiers and the south Korean puppet clique.

In this way, all are achieving innovations in militant political training and in carrying out their militant duties, with a burning hatred for class enemies.

9062
CSO: 4108

CLASS INDOCTRINATION OF STUDENTS PRAISED

Pyongyang NODONG CHONGNYON in Korean 17 Jan 80 p 3

[Article by Chin Sun-hui: "Oppose the Enemy and Fight to the End"]

[Text] On the job with Comrade [tongmu] Sim Chong-nan, class section leader at Ipchol Senior Middle School in Taean City....

The great leader Marshal Kim Il-song taught as follows:

"Students must be armed with the concept that imperialism, landlords and capitalists loathe class, so that they may resolutely struggle to oppose class enemies and exploitive systems."

Embracing the teaching of the great leader, class section leader Comrade Sim Chong-nan is firmly stepping-up class indoctrination among the students so that they will be armed with the concept that imperialism, landlords and capitalists loathe class, so that they may resolutely struggle to oppose enemies of the revolution and exploitive systems.

On one occasion the class section leader organized a discussion session with an old man living in Sohak-tong.

The hearts of the students were filled with hatred for the evil enemy when they had heard the heart-rending story of the old grandfather, who had worked himself to the bone in a mine during Japanese imperialist occupation and been subjected to the contempt and persecution of the Japanese imperialists and capitalists.

"Now we better understand just how cruel and cunning are the Japanese imperialists, the landlords and the capitalists."

So saying, students Kim Chun-pil, Cho Man-sok and Sin Hyok resolved to fight to the end in opposition of the enemies of the revolution.

The class section leader resolved to impart to the students an understanding of the essential nature of occupation that constitutes imperialism and the reactionary nature of exploitive systems which matched their increased level of class consciousness.

Thinking thus, the class section leader had to lay a foundation and further intensify class indoctrination among the students so that they would have a deep understanding that occupation and exploitation constitute the essential nature of imperialism and exploitive systems.

She organized a discussion session among the students, posing a question on the patriotic struggle of our people who sunk the U.S. imperialist occupation vessel "Sherman."

The class section leader explained that about 100 years ago, the U.S. imperialist vessel "Sherman" was in the process of penetrating our nation for occupation.

At that point, student Kim Un-hak asked why the U.S. imperialist vessel "Sherman" was to occupy our nation.

The class section leader used the question to open up discussion and debate.

Some students said they thought the vessel had come to plunder our nation's treasures of gold and silver, and some said it was with the objective of scouting out our nation for occupation.

"That is correct. Imperialists, and in particular the U.S. imperalists, cannot survive without occupying and exploiting other nations, and plundering them, and do all manner of misdeeds with the intention of occupying not only our country but nations throughout the world. Imperialists, and of course landlords and evil capitalists, act cunningly to conceal such dark designs. This vile nature of these enemies will not change until the day they die. Consequently, students must thoroughly understand the reactionary nature of imperialism and exploitive systems and despise these enemies even more, and be firmly tempered with a readiness to fight to the end against them."

Last year alone she read more than 80 books on various subjects of class indoctrination, and, while imparting their contents to the students at every opportunity, filled their hearts with hatred for enemies of the revolution.

In this way, from their earliest years students here burn with a high degree of class consciousness which enables them to oppose all enemies of the revolution and to fight mercilessly against them to the end.

9062
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YOUTH INDOCTRINATION BY PARTY CENTER PRAISED

Pyongyang NODONG CHONGNYON in Korean 26 Jan 80 p 2

[Article by Kang Kyong-sil: "Let Only Chuche-Type Blood Flow Within the Ranks of the SWYL"]

[Text] There has never been a time like today when our youth have been so renowned as the glorious generation, a new generation which reveres the great leader Marshal Kim Il-song and the glorious party just as sunflowers reflect the sun, and in whose veins flow pure chuche-type blood. Indeed, today our maturing new generation is being reliably prepared as successors to the revolution who will carry on the chuche lineage generation after generation.

Too numerous to count are the youth team members who marched out en masse to the rural villages after graduating from senior middle school, achieving outstanding results at the van of creating chuche agricultural methods, in emulation of the youth team members of Unha-ri who, having embraced the ardent hope and aspiration to transform their home villages into communist paradises as part of the new history of "Hwanggumsan" mapped out by the great leader, marched out en masse to the rural villages and, having performed well in the first year, sent a letter to the great leader giving him the fruit of their labor as a gift of loyalty.

These are the youth team members who delighted the fatherly leader by increasing the tobacco harvest several times over in one year, and the youth who achieved the miraculous result of increasing the yield in tideland reclamation agriculture by some 10 tons per chongbo [1 chongbo = 2.45 acres] in the very first year.

This is the youth team movement which blazes like a torch throughout our socialist rural villages.

This is the new generation of the revolution which, venerating the great leader, finds the blessings of youth along the path whereon the long-term plans of the great leader are made to blossom, and takes the resolute steps of combatants only along the path of upholding the purpose of the great leader.

The extraordinary feats of our young generation of successors to the revolution do not end with the sense of pleasure and trust imparted to individuals.

Comrade An Myong-hui, a weaver at the Sariwon Textiles Mill, completed her quota for the Second Seven Year Plan in just eight months, and Comrade Yi Yong-hae, a moulding worker in the casting shop of the Nakwon Machinery Plant, fulfilled his Second Seven Year Plan quota in one year.

The new generation not only stands at the very forefront of labor today, but is vigorously ascending to the lofty peaks of the new Seven Year Plan.

Comrade Yi Yong-ae of the Nakwon Machinery Plant, who rejected a recommendation that he work as a crane operator and asked to be assigned to the more difficult job in the casting shop, was quoted as saying:

"Day after day of transformation, our new generation has to become the masters of the jobs that had been performed by 10 Nakwon party members, and, like those 10 party members, our youth are the ones who shine forth as stars of loyalty in giving joy to the fatherly leader."

Unspoiled, clean and pure is the chuche-type blood which flows constantly in the hearts of our youth who shoulder, generation after generation, the great revolutionary undertaking of chuche and who represent the future of the Korean revolution, and whose sole hope and aspiration is to always live and work for the great leader and the party.

In thinking about our youth, who enjoy revolution and struggle and who find the rewards and well-being of youth only in service to the great leader and the party, people reflect on the great love which nurtures and guides this solid new generation.

The respected and beloved leader Marshal Kim Il-song has taught as follows:

"Without the leadership of our party, there can be no thought of freedom and well-being for our people, nor any hope for either the development of the youth movement or a promising future for the young people."

The young generation of this land, who bask in the wise leadership and warm affection of the great leader Marshal Kim Il-song just as all living things in the world spring forth and thrive under the sun in the sky, are maturing steadily into chuche-type communist revolutionaries possessed of a beautiful ideological and spiritual character.

The great leader Marshal Kim Il-song has focused deep concern on political and ideological indoctrination concerning our young generation.

The lessons of history teach that the problem of nurturing successors to revolution and the problem of indoctrinating youth are pivotal problems which impact on the future of the revolution and the destiny of the people.

How then can these truly pivotal problems be solved?

The great leader, who deeply understands with scientific perception the urgent demands of the times, has provided a clear answer:

The youth must continue the revolution generation after generation.

This is a concept that indicates, under circumstances where imperialism continues and revolution is harsh and protracted, that revolutionary reserves must be well prepared to bring about the final victory of the revolution.

The great leader Marshal Kim Il-song has pured enormous labor into the political and ideological indoctrination of the maturing new generation so that they will, through life in the Socialist Working Youth League [SWYL], be nurtured into revolutionaries thoroughly infused with the revolutionary world view of chuche.

While always emphasizing that the ideological indoctrination of youth is the primary task of the SWYL, the respected and beloved leader has provided revolutionary leadership in firmly directing the unitary ideological indoctrination and revolutionary indoctrination of the party in a manner suited to the developing reality.

Whenever the respected and beloved leader has met and talked with SWYL functionaries and youth, and each time he has personally participated in SWYL congresses, he has vividly illuminated the theoretical and practical problems associated with nurturing successors to the revolution and has focused various forms of attention on youth indoctrination.

The grand plan and lofty purpose of the respected and beloved leader with regard to youth indoctrination has always been gloriously embodied by our party center, with proud results being achieved with each step.

From the beginning the youth movement was set forth as a glorious movement which essentially embodies the revolutionary thought of the leader of the working class and transfers the great revolutionary undertaking of the leader from generation to generation; the nurturing of all youth within the formalized party to be revolutionary combatants endlessly loyal to the great leader Marshal Kim Il-song was established as the ultimate objective of political and ideological indoctrination.

It is in this movement that the resolute support and determination of our party to thoroughly defend and carry out the revolutionary undertaking of the great leader are tightly interwoven, and the brilliance of the great concept of nurturing and molding our youth to be masters of the future overflowing.

From the beginning efforts were made within the party, which had established the policy on guiding all aspects of thoroughly implementing the party's unitary ideology system within the youth league, to light the beacons of the "Movement to Read 10 Thousand Pages of Books" at Kim Il Song University and thus accelerate the work of arming the entire league with the revolutionary thought of the great leader and the policies of the party, and to popularized the example of the Yaksu Middle School, which established a revolutionary traditions collection and solidified and work of research on revolutionary tradition, so that all school children could learn from the revolutionary history of the great leader.

The party, which firmly guides SWYL organizations toward control of party policy indoctrination and revolutionary tradition indoctrination, is providing vigorous guidance in nurturing our youth to be chuche-type revolutionaries who make the revolutionary thought and chuche thought of the great leader their world view, and who make endless loyalty to the leader their reason for being, in a manner consistent with the demands of today's reality in which the whole society is being dyed with chuche thought.

The party, which observes with warm love each step, be it only an inch, that the youth progress down the road of loyalty, has clearly set forth its policy on youth indoctrination and has stated that, inasmuch as the SWYL is the organization which nurtures successors to the revolution, it is more important for it, more than any other organization, to take substantial responsibility for indoctrinating SWYL members and Young Pioneers with loyalty toward the great leader.

The glorious party center has indicated to SWYL functionaries, that, if they are to fully carry out loyalty indoctrination toward the great leader among the youth, the proper use of oral and printed propaganda is a useful tool, and has also provided methods which require that youth work correctly conduct ideological indoctrination and organizational work in a manner which suits its special nature.

Inasmuch as the thought and theory on youth work newly developed and enriched by the party center fully embody the thought and theory of the fatherly leader on youth indoctrination, they are an ideological and theoretical weapon for fuiding the ranks of youth along the road of loyality.

The glorious party center, which long ago established the loyalty slogan "Let Us Learn from the Great Leader" and which made learning from the period of the great leader's youth the basic principle of youth work, has launched the "Campaign to Learn from the Glorious Youth of the Great Leader" in a manner suited to dyeing the whole society with chuche thought, and has thus provided a perfect answer to the epocal question of how, and using what techniques and methods, to solve the problem of raising successors to the revolution in youth indoctrination.

Under the wise leadership of the party center, the SWYL, by focusing on this campaign as the central objective of its work and vigorously accelerating it, will more thoroughly embody the intention of the great leader for youth to form a revolutionary world view during the period of SWYL life.

Noting that the base and means of indoctrination developed by the great leader must be made better use of it youth are to be nurtured as revolutionary combatants endlessly loyal to the fatherly leader, the party center has established an administrative system for youth schools, in particular, to become powerful bases of youth indoctrination.

In addition, the epochal step was taken to increase the distribution of publications on youth indoctrination, and to strongly manage the [publishing] base.

Further, the glorious party, embracing the intentions of the great leader who placed enormous significance on revolutionary novels in youth indoctrination, adopted the measure of having more revolutionary novels produced, and further decided to have novels carried in newspapers to that all young people could read more books.

Using the glorious path that opened a new era of chuche in the Korean revolution and the thousand-ri path of restoration of independence as a base of operations for youth indoctrination, the party center organized a march of 10,000 persons to experience-by-doing, an event unprecedented in the world, and brought to bear tremendous concern so that every year tens of thousands of young people experience-by-doing [the march down] this glorious path.

The unlimited warmth of the fatherly leader, who worries and cares with the affection of parents who send their children far away, and the congratulatory letters of the party center sent to participants in the experience-by-doing march who have embraced his lofty intentions--in such warm affection is surely nestled the noble intent to nurture all our youth and students to be chuche-type revolutionaries endlessly loyal to the great leader.

The great leader and the bosom of the party does indeed constitute a fatherly bosom of unlimited warmth and kindness, the bosom of the revolution, which nurtures the new generation growing on this land to be genuine and resolute communist revolutionaries who will highly respect and revere the fatherly leader until the sun and moon no longer shine.

Truly there can be no generation whose well-being and dignity are greater than those of our youth who live within such a bosom; our youth must firmly prepare themselves within this bosom to be chuche-type revolutionaries, and to proudly continue, and gloriously complete, the great revolutionary undertaking of chuche generation after generation.

9062
CSO: 4108

APPEARANCE OF CODE WORD 'PARTY CENTER' NOTED

Seoul VANTAGE POINT in English Vol 3 No 2, Feb 80 pp 22-23

[Text] Today, seven years after President Il-song reportedly started grooming his son Chong-al as his successor, the "Party Center," the code word construed as indicating the young Kim, appears frequently in north Korean mass media. Since the turn of 1980, the "glorious Party Center" has appeared in No Dong S Inmun, organ of the north Korean Workers' Party, together with the "great leader" (Kim Il-song) for all relevant occasions, such as meetings. Furthermore, the role and achievements of the Party Center have been compared to those of the "great leader."

Although there has been no hint as to what the "Party Center" means apart from its official reference to the Party Central Committee, many north Korea watchers have been interpreting it as implying the junior Kim. The Voice of the Revolutionary Party for Reunification, a north Korean broadcasting station, which Pyongyang claims is operated in Seoul, more or less decoded the word on January 29.

According to its broadcast that defined the qualifications of the successor of the "great leader," the "glorious Party Center meets all requirements for the successor and has been leading the Chuche revolutionary task toward the victorious end." The qualifications of the successor as cited by the radio are that he should: 1) be die-hard and loyal to the great leader, 2) have a specific quality of ideological sense to take over the great leader's task, 3) be articulate, energetic and tenacious enough to counter the reactionary forces that try to impede the great leader's task, 4) have authoritative power and the confidence and support of the public, 5) be fostered and trained by the great leader, and 6) be chosen from the younger generation so as to succeed to the great leader's task.

All the five major social meetings held in January cited the role and achievements of the Party Center together with those of the "great leader." While the 18th plenary session of the General Federation of Trade Unions, January 19-22, and the 21st plenary session of the Socialist Working Youth Central Committee, January 28-29, emphasized the need for strict discipline under the leadership of the Party Center, the third convention of the Writer's League, January 7-10, the 25th anniversary ceremony of the Scientific-Education Film Studio, January 26 and the 55th anniversary ceremony of the "1,000-ri journey of liberation" on January 22 attributed their achievements to the leadership of the "great leader and the Party Center." No Dong S Inmun editorials on January 2, 16 and 22 used the "Party Center" not along with the "great leader." The editorials urged the "whole Party, whole army and the public should rally behind the Party Center."

The possibility is high that the young Kim will be designated as successor to his father at the sixth congress of the Workers' Party to be held in coming October. The VRPR broadcast said, "It is the glory and duty of the masses of working people to uphold the successor to the great leader in high esteem while the latter is alive." A north Korea watcher in Seoul says, "Pyongyang's celebration of the young Kim's brithday, February 16, will tell more about the heirship question."

CSO: 4120

MAJOR POINTS OF KIM'S NEW YEAR'S MESSAGE OUTLINED

Tokyo KITA CHOSEN KENKYU in Japanese No 67, Jan 80 pp 4-6

[Article: "President Kim Il-song's New Year Message"]

[Text] On 1 January, President Kim Il-song's new year message was published.

Special features of this year's new year message are as follows: in the economic field: 1) grain production target was announced as 9.5 million tons, 2) production themes were concrete, and 3) economic management was emphasized. It was the first time in 3 years since 1977 that the grain production target was mentioned in the new year message. As for the order of priority of the economic field, extractive industry and trade occupy first and third places respectively as in 1979, while transportation conspicuously replaced basic industries in second place. In 1979 transportation was in fifth place; in 1978 it was the second important theme in terms of priority. This shows that transportation still remains the bottleneck for North Korea's economic development. Evidence of the worsening evil of bureaucracy, which is well recognized as an obstacle to economic development, is that the formerly low prioritized "Improvement of Economic Management" has risen to fourth place this year. Considering the fact that this year's themes of economic sectors were generally revealed in the new year's message as "the 1980 Economic Plan will be accomplished prior to the Sixth Party Congress (note: October 1980)," it may be said that this requirement is unusually stringent.

With regard to non-economic fields, no mention was made whatsoever about foreign policy aims except for an expression of "support for the struggle of the South Korean people." Aside from this, there was merely a slight mention of the strengthening of the military.

The following are the details of the 1979 actual achievements and the 1980 objectives as made known through the new year message:

1. 1979 Achievements

a. Production index:

	1979	1978
Total industrial production	cf. '78, 115% +	cf. '77, 117% +
Electricity	cf. '78, 114% +	cf. '77, 110% +
Rolling stee.	cf. '78, 115% +	cf. steel '77, 127% +
Chemical fertilizer	cf. '78, 113% +	cf. '77, 123% +
Cement	cf. '78, 121% +	cf. '77, 132% +
Total export	cf. '78, 1.3 times +	
Grains	9 million tons	
Per Capita Income	$1,920*	

* PCI for 1974 was $1,000 (KITA CHOSEN KENKYU No 42, p 23).

b. On-going Construction:

Youth Chemmcal Complex's high pressure polyethelyne plant and anylon plant.

Taean Heavy Machinery Plant's No 2 integrated processing workshop.

Tanch'on Magnesia Plant's 110 meter revolving furnace.

2. 1980 Targets.

Priority	Field	Target contents	1979
1	Excavation	Continue to increase anthracite production. 2. Increase production of high calorie coals and cokes from Anju and northern regions' coal mines. 3. Reinforce with mine shafts. 4. Enlarge and modernize excavation facilities. 5. Pro-integrated mechanization of tunnel operations.	Excavation industry

Priority	Field	Target contents	1979
2	Transporation	1. Organizational improvement. 2. Increase the traction ratio of electric locomotives to above 85 percent. 3. Modernize and increase loading capacity of transportation methods. 4. Operate trains to run at high speed. 5. Increase production of cargo ships. 6. Develop navigational routes of rivers. 7. Renovate and enlarge trading ports.	Key industries
3	Trade	1. Project multilateral and diverse trade. 2. Adhere to No 1 principle of maintaining trust. 3. Output of export products is to be given preference over all other industries. 4. Improve packaging and quality. 5. Strictly observe delivery date.	
4	Improve economic guidance & industrial management	1. Map out in detail the economic programs. 2. Establish strict discipline for cooperative production. 3. All plants and offices are to adopt the practice of timing their projects daily, monthly, semiannually by indexing. 4. Manage to obtain maximum utilization of facilities by full operation of all facilities through timely checkups, maintenance and repairs. 5. Launch campaigns to save materials and improve quality.	Production of consumer goods
5	Promote technological revolution	Metal industry: 1. Increase production capacity of smelting furnaces through the use of domestic fuel. 2. Adopt new refining methods. Chemical Industry: 1. Maintain and strengthen existing plants. 2. Develop in many ways chemical industry that uses limestones and anthracites as raw material.	Transportation

Priority	Field	Target contents	1979
		Construction material industry: 1. Modernize kilns. 2. Expand raw material bases. 3. Increase variety and quality of fire-proof materials. Machine industry: 1. Adopt new method of casting. 2. Raise the comparative importance of manufacturing by stamp forging and pressing methods. 3. Realize full and semi-automation in production processes. 4. Increase production of large machinery facilities required for nature-remaking projects. Others: 1. Strengthen scientific research. 2. Increase scientific invention. 3. Strengthen ideological struggles against conservatism, negativism and mysticism toward technology. 4. Spread technological innovation movement among the producer masses.	
6	Agriculture	1. Grain production target 9.5 million tons. 2. Promote cultivation of arable land, terrace farming, and reclamation work. 3. Increase handicraft products and promote livestock breeding, cultivation of fruit trees and sericulture.	Agriculture
7	Consumer goods production	Light industry: Increase production of good quality daily necessities, and tasty, high nutrition value food items. Fishery: 1. Establish scientific system of fishing. 2. Modernize fishing vessels and equipment. Enlarge unloading areas, cold storage plants and processing facilities.	Economic policy

Priority	Field	Target contents	1979
8	Control of water	Build many dams and construct more hydroelectric power plants.	Coping with managerial staff
9	Cultural construction	None	
10	Military	KPA officers, soldiers and people's security forces to strive in combat and political trainings and to further strengthen units' combat readiness and fighting ability.	Unification policy
11	Coping with managerial staff	Elevate feeling of responsibility and role.	Foreign policy
12	Unification policy	Support totally the struggle of the South Korean people.	

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NORTH, SOUTH KOREAN CONCEPTS OF 'GRAIN PRODUCTION' EXAMINED

Seoul T'ONG'IL CHONGCH'AEK [UNIFICATION POLICY QUARTERLY] in Korean Vol 5, No 1, 1979 pp 143-173

[Article by Pak Il-song, member of the Standing Research Committee, National Unification Advisory Council: "A Comparative Analysis of the Key Concepts of 'Grain Production' in South and North Korea"]

[Text] Introduction (Perception of the Problem and Methodology)

As can be seen in Table 1, in terms of distribution of industry and population on the Korean peninsula following liberation, North Korea had the advantage only in heavy industry, with South Korea enjoying predominance in light industry, agriculture, commercial business and population.

Table 1 A Comparison of Industrial Distribution in South and North Korea After Liberation (%)

Unit	South Korea	North Korea	Source
Heavy Industry	35	65	*
Light Industry	69	31	
Agriculture	63	37	
Commercial Business	82	18	
Population	62	38	**

(1) U.S. intelligence data ("Korea: The Economic Race Between the North and the South": Central Intelligence Agency National Foreign Assessment Center, January 1978)

(2) See Korea Development Bank publication HANGUK SANOP KYONGJE SIMNYONSA (1945-1955) [History of a Decade of Korea's Industrial Economy (1945-1955)]

As indicated above, the ratio of industrial goods between South and North Korea was 63 percent to 37 percent in favor of South Korea. According to this same data, in agricultural products South Korea held about a 70-30 advantage over the north in production of rice.[1] Accordingly in overall cereals production and overall rice production, South Korea was also ahead in per-capita production.[2] It is recorded that, in 1944, the annual per-capita consumption of cereal grains on the Korean peninsula was 178.6 kg.[3]

As can be seen in Table 2, according to grain production figures published by South and North Korea respectively in the years following liberation, in terms of growth North Korea outpaced the south to a considerable extent so that currently overall production in north and south is about the same, but, in terms of per-capita production, North Korea overwhelmingly surpassed the ROK. This stems from the fact that the population of the ROK is currently about 2.2 times that of North Korea.

Table 2 Published Figures for Grain Production in South and North Korea [in thousands of tons]

Year	South Korea (1)	North Korea (2)
1944		2,417
1946	2,855	1,898
1947	2,629	2,069
1974	6,921	7,000
1975	7,672	7,700
1976	8,205	8,000

(1) For South Korean production figures, those for 1946 and 1947 are based on publications of the Research Section, Korea Development Bank of Korea. These figures were extracted from the "Summary Table of Food Grain Supply by Year" in HANGUK SANOP KYONJESA [History of the Development and Economy of Korea] p 88. Figures for 1974, 1975 and 1976 are from the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries publication NONGNIM T'ONGGYE YONP'YO "Agriculture and Forestry Statistical Annual Report" (1978).

(2) Figures published by North Korea. Those for 1947 and before are from the "Korea Central Yearbook" (1958) p 196; those for 1974 and after are from data from the first meeting of North Korea's Sixth Supreme People's Assembly, 6 Dec 1977 (National Unification Board, PUKKOE TONGHYANG CHARYO [Trends in North Korea] October, November and December 1977, p 422); figure for 1976 is from Kim Il-song's 1977 new year's address (published by Data Research Bureau, National Unification Board, January 1977). North Korean figures are all from primary sources.

In addition, North Korea claimed to have produced "8.5 million tons of grain" in 1977.[4] The North Korean claim in this regard is as follows. A Pyongyang broadcast of 2 January 1978 claimed that, "We have produced 4.6 times the amount of grain in our farms than the total amount harvested in the northern half of the republic immediately following liberation...this figure represents an amazing 1.5 million tons in excess of the grain harvest produced in all of Korea prior to liberation."[5]

If this is true, it would mean that the North Korean people consume a much greater amount of grain than do South Koreans and still have a preposterous surplus. Kim Il-song reportedly said in July 1975 and at the beginning of 1976 that the per capita consumption of grain by the North Korean populace is 300 kg per annum, and that the overall requirements for cereal grains for North Korea is between 4.5 and 4.8 million tons.[6]

For comparison, Table 3 shows annual per capita consumption of grain for the Korean peninsula prior to liberation, and figures published by both South and North Korea following liberation.

Table 3 Annual Per Capita Grain Consumption for Korea (kg)

Year	Korea as a Whole (1)	ROK (2)	North Korea (3)
1942	201.4		
1944	178.6		
1946		155.4	
1976		121 (rice)	300

(1) op cit "History of the Industrial Economy of Korea" pp 87-88.

(2) ibid for ROK figures for 1946; see KYONGHYANG SINMUN 25 Aug 78 for the 1976 figure for the ROK.

(3) For the North Korean figure for 1976, see Kim Il-song's remarks, op cit.

If we take this for granted, then a food surplus in North Korea becomes preposterous. In this regard, the North Koreans claim that, "Last year the North produced 8.5 million tons of grain, and at the beginning of this year we expect to export more than 500,000 tons of rice and several tens of thousands of tons of corn to Indonesia and some 20 other nations...wherever you go in the country the rice bins are overflowing and there is enough rice for every pot for several years; as a result, our nation's food reserves stand unused, the people don't know what it is like to yearn for rice, and we consume what we need every year and export the remainder to other nations."[7]

All the same, North Korea is propagandizing when it says that it produces so much grain that the people can eat as they please and have sufficient reserves for export.

The North Koreans emphasize that the reason for their increased production of foodstuffs is as follows, i.e., that with the support of their strong socialist industrial base they have achieved the irrigation, electrification, mechanization and chemicalization of the rural villages, and that, with the introduction of chuche thought into agriculture in accordance with Kim Il-song's chuche agricultural methodology, they have initiated nature rebuilding projects on a large scale and have succeeded at the same time in the development of seeds which are suitable to both soil and climatic conditions, the result being the production of large quantities of grain.[8]

They further emphasize that, "The ability to cope with unusual weather conditions, primarily caused by the cold front, and thus produce 8.5 million tons of grain for the first time in history, was due totally to the guidance of Kim Il-song and his concern."[9] In other words, the reasons for increased food production in North Korea include the superiority of the socialist system, the excellence of Kim Il-song's leadership and his policies, and chuche agricultural methods (improvement of technology) and so on.

These claims by the North Koreans will be examined later, but what cannot be ignored at this point is that information contradicting such claims continues to be made available from both internal and external sources. "I defected to the south because I was hungry"--there are still many people who remember the press conference of 17-year old North Korean Army soldier Mr Yi Sok-mo.[10]

In addition, there are continuous reports from defectors to the south and from foreigners who have been to North Korea that the distribution of food there, in terms of quality, is getting worse and worse.

Such data on the worsening food situation in North Korea as have been reported will be looked at later, but several instances are noted as follows by way of reference.

According to Mr Kim Yong-kyu, former deputy bureau chief in the secretariat of the Central Committee of the North Korean Workers Party, who defected to the south in September 1976, every year is a bad year in North Korea and even cadres like him suffer severe shortages of food, not to mention the general population.[11] Another fact that has become known is that, according to what is common knowledge amongst defectors, there is an increase of people who are suffering from pellagra in North Korea as a result of malnutrition.[12]

Furthermore, foreign media, quoting recent comments by officials of the Thai Ministry of Commerce, report that North Korea hopes to import 70,000 tons of rice, 120,000 tons of corn, 30,000 tons of soybeans as well as such commodities as aluminum by the end of the year in accordance with a recently concluded trade agreement signed with Thailand.[13]

As shown here, news contradicting North Korean statements about its grain situation continues to circulate. Can we pass this over as being the dialectical two sides of a subject?

Of course, within the security and psychological war dimension that we face in relations between South and North Korea, our nation's future in the context of the historical process toward unification will not sanction such a lax position.

North Korea claims that in spite of its disadvantages in natural and climatic conditions as compared with the South and because of the superiority of the communist system and the leadership of Kim Il-song, it has overcome its status inferior to the South of the days of Japanese imperialism to secure a status superior to the South. This is somehow not quite believable.

Those who have defected to the South, in discussing the reasons for the worsening food situation in North Korea, express the opinion that "food is stockpiled in preparation for war; agriculture is stagnant; rice is conserved and foodstuffs are exported to obtain foreign exchange; [the government is] non-responsive and so on. These are also hard to believe.[14]

In addition, there is not a consensus among domestic and foreign experts on North Korea, whose views on North Korea's food situation fall mainly into three categories. That is, those who go along with North Korea, those who view North Korea's published data only as propaganda, and those who totally disregard data published by North Korea and make their own independent estimates.[15]

Such approaches to North Korea's food situation do nothing in the way of providing a solution, but on the contrary serve only to further North Korean propaganda without doing anything to help domestic and foreign views of North Korea, the perception of security by the Korean people through psychological warfare, or the establishment of a national food policy in time of war or against the time when unification has taken place.

What, then, is the source of this discord in the way North Korea's food situation is viewed? As is often the case, here too we can say that the reasons are, first, the shortage of data on North Korea's tightly held policies, and second, North Korean differences which make it difficult for analysts to understand any data that is obtained. Accordingly, this paper considers the most basic and important analytic objective is an analysis of North Korea's actual food situation to be an understanding of their different view of food, and to establish criteria for an analysis of North Korea's view of food.

In order to achieve these objectives, first this paper will compare various North Korean claims and related materials so as to bring out some common sense questions; second, it will analyze current domestic and foreign views on North Korea's food situation to confirm that the discord stems from an inability to correctly understand North Korea's different view of food; and third, it will investigate the source of North Korea's different food production statistics concept, the food production statistics concepts of various communist countries (the Soviet Union and Communist China) so as to reveal and evaluate the exaggeration of North Korea's food production statistics and the political goals of that exaggeration in light of their different concept of food production, thereby establishing a view of North Korea's food situation and contributing to an understanding of North Korea's actual food situation and the establishing of a food policy toward North Korea in case of emergency.

I. Various North Korean Claims and Their Problems

1. North Korean Food Production Reports

As seen in Table 4, North Korea's food production report figures coincide with their plan figures every year; in addition, the fact that their figures have gradually come to approximate the yearly food production figures of the ROK requires our attention.

Table 4. North Korea's Food Production Plans and Reports of Results (10,000 t)

Year	Plan	Results Reported	ROK Results	Remarks
1960	380.0	380.3	(527.0)	
1961	480.0	483.0	(593.0)	
1962	500.0	500.0	(542.0)	
63-73	no report	no reports	(574.0)*	*ROK figures for 63
1974	700.0	700.0	(692.1)	
1975	770.0*	770.0	(764.2)	*Kim Il-song's New Year Address
1976	800.0	800.0	(820.6)	

Notes: North Korean figures are from Kil Il-song's new year addresses and the CHOSON CHUNGANG YON'GAM; post-1974 figures are from Kim Il-song's new year addresses and other North Korean materials.

ROK figures are Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries statistics

As anyone could point out from Table 4, first North Korea's production plan figures and production achievement figures coincide every year, and second, North Korea's grain production plan figures and reports of results announced since 1962 are similar to the ROK's production figures every year.

Of the questions arising from these figures, first it is difficult to believe that North Korea's achievements coincide with its plans every year in agriculture which is carried out under variable natural and climatic conditions when such coincidence between plan and achievement is a difficult thing even in industrial products which are manufactured by precision machinery.

Second, it is also strange that North Korea's plan and production figures be similar to the ROK's production figures every year since 1962.

This is because everyone acknowledges that North Korea is less fortunate than the ROK in terms of climate, natural conditions, population and area of arable land.

What kind of consciousness do these North Korean plan and production figures signify and how must we regard it? Also, what are the North's claims in this matter?

2. Production Increase Factors Claimed by North Korea

A. System Aspect

As noted previously, North Korea claims that the rapid growth of its food production is due to the communist system (collective farm system) and the chuche farming method of Kim Il-song.

Furthermore, they present a distorted explanation of the reasons why the ROK's agriculture has stagnated in comparison with that of North Korea. That is, they say "unlike the rural areas of the northern half of the Republic which develop and flourish daily under the wise leadership of the leader, the South Korean rural areas are today being thoroughly devastated through the colonial enslavement policy and anti-people agricultural policy of American imperialism."[16]

They are also engaging in distortion as they criticize the ROK Government for "subjecting South Korea's rural areas to extortion for the execution of policies of aggression and war even while paying loud lip service to rural modernization and agriculture-first policies...the Saemanl [New Village] Movement, too, is...an anti-people extortion machination for the further strengthening of the extortion of the peasantry and is nothing more than a deceptive program to quiet the daily rising discontent and resistance of the peasants."[17]

This is done clearly for propagandizing the North's collective farming system and Kim Il-song's leadership as superior to the ROK's Saemanl Movement and free farming system. Of course, there is a good side and a bad side to everything. They no doubt have their strong points and we our weak points.

However, everyone recognizes that, taken as a whole, the communist collective system is inferior.

Earlier the Soviet Premier Krushchev stated during a session of the Politburo that the USSR, having bought and operated an American gold production plant, could not produce the volume of the Americans, saying that "the capitalists achieve high production figures; it is unacceptable that we, using the same equipment, cannot achieve their figures," and that "we must adapt to our economy all the modern methods used in capitalist countries."[18]

Although Krushchev lost power shortly thereafter, the inferiority of the Soviet Union's collective farm system is still today known to be unchanged.

The Soviet Union's small scale private lands (gardens) are said to produce one-third of the Soviet Union's total beef and milk, one-third of its vegetables, 50 percent of its potatoes and two-fifths of its eggs, although these gardens comprise only 1.5 percent of the total arable land.[19]

In the case of North Korea, at a nationwide agricultural conference Kim Il-song expressed dissatisfaction in reference to North Korea's agricultural deficiencies, saying "now many countries are spreading the so-called Green Revolution (seed improvement work) and increasing their grain production several times but our scientists are not doing a good job in seed improvement work." Also, in reference to the cooperative farm system, he emphasized, "We must establish the trait of proper maintenance of farm equipment on the cooperative farms," and continued, pointing to the fact that "at present some farms are not taking care of threshing areas and properly reaping so that much grain is being wasted."

While emphasizing ideological revolution work to correct these deficiencies, Kim pointed out that "lately among some functionaries there has been an insufficient master-like attitude so that work has frequently been done in a laborist manner," said that "we must oppose the idea of being idle and of eating without working...we must oppose the phenomenon of eating away at the communal property of state and society and struggle strongly in opposition to the phenomenon of wasting the communal property in rural areas," after which he lamented, "That we do not struggle strongly against the phenomenon of neglecting state regulations is now a great deficiency."

As the reason, Kim cited that "instead of working faithfully for the peasantry, many county level organ functionaries behave as bureaucrats; this is because the county party committees have not filled their roles properly," and for corrective measures, he ordered, "From now on the critique of the rural thesis which is carried out each year must be done not only in the rural villages, but also in all organs of the counties related to the rural areas including the county parties and county administrative committees and the county cooperative farm committees."[20]

This is an attempt to correct the central contradiction of the communist economic system, bureaucratism. However, can Kim Il-song's doctrinism, which, unlike the revisionism of eastern European countries and the Soviet Union that is gradually introducing the free farming system, is oriented toward the "state operation" of agriculture, raise the peasants productivity, since such bureaucratism and communist farming systems decrease the peasants' desire to produce and aggrevate the food shortage? This, too, must be considered a question.[21]

B. Policy Aspect

(1) Comparison of the Farming Base (Natural and Climatic Conditions) of North and South

It is a fact that Kim Il-song is strongly developing the doctrinaire "Three Revolutions Movement" (ideology, culture, technology) and the Rural Modernization Policy (irrigation, mechanization, electrification, chemicalization) along with the "chuche farming method" (right crop for the right land, plant breeding) in the rural areas in order to overcome the deficiencies of the communist system and the disadvantages of natural and climatic conditions.[22]

However, as the following table shows, North Korea's agricultural base is greatly inferior compared to the ROK in terms of natural conditions, climate, and population.

Table 5. Comparison of Natural & Climatic Conditions, North & South (1976)

Item	Unit	ROK	N. Korea	Remarks
Total Area	km^2	98,477.48	122,370.38	On whole, favorable for ROK. 1 chong = 99 ares
Total Arable Land	1000 chong	2,373	2,054	
% Arable to Total	(%)	(2.41)	(1.66)	
Wet Paddie Land	1000 chong	1,215	631	
(% Irrigated)	(%)	84	91	
Total Population (A)	1000 persons	35,860	16,176	Favorable to ROK
Farming Population (B)	1000 persons	13,244	6,936	
(A/B)	(%)	(36.3)	(42.8)	
Temperature (Year Avg)	Centigrade	10-14	2-10	Favorable to ROK
Rainfall (Year Avg)	mm	890-1,900	580-1,500	
Frostfree Days (Year Avg)	Days per Year	160-280	135-220	
Total Vegetative Area	chong	3,166,018	2,728,000	Favorable to ROK

Source: Hong Ki-ch'an, "Nambukhan Yongnong Kiban mit Saegsan Nungnyok Pigyo" [Comparison of North and South Korea's farming base and production capabilities[in National Unification Board, KUKT'ONGJO, 77-12-1344.

(2) Comparison of North and South Korean Policies for Building Farming Bases

Item	Unit	Quantities	N. Korea	Remarks
Irrigation	(%)	84	91	Favorable to North
Electrification	(%)	98	100	
Mechanization	10,000	12.8 (cultivators)	7-8 (tractors)	
Chemicalization				
Chemical Fertilizers	10,000 tons	152.6	55	1970 data
Fertilizer Application	kg per ha	244.8	154.6	
Agricultural Chemicals	10,000 tons	9.0	1.5	

[Table 6 continued on following page]

Item	Unit	Quantities	N. Korea	Remarks
Technology (plant breeding)		world level	backward	Favorable to ROK
Rice (results)	1965-70	49% (increase)	10% (inc)	
Barley (results)	10a/kg	400	150	
Wheat (results)	10a/kg	500	220-250	
Corn (results)	10a/kg	714-1000	500	
Soybeans (results)	10a/kg	236	135-165	
Sweet Potatoes (results)	10a/kg	favorable	-	
Potatoes		-	favorable	
Mixed Grains		similar	similar	
Farming Techniques		favorable (peasants)	unfavorable (non-peasant women & girls)	Favorable to ROK
Rural Movements		Saemanl Projects	Ch'ongsan-ri Method (bureaucratism)	

Source: Same as Table 5

From the tables above, it appears that North Korea has an on-paper advantage over the ROK in electrification, irrigation, and mechanization, but it is said that due to the poor quality of the tractors their rate of operation is no more than 42 percent.[23]

In addition it is a widely acknowledged fact that the ROK is becoming a model for the world in chemicalization, technology (breeding/farming technology) and the rural Saemanl Movement.

In contrast, since the late 1950's North Korea has shouted about the "Ch'ongsan-ri Spirit" and the "Ch'ongsan-ri Method" and has recently put forth the "Chuche Farming Method"; however, as Churchill once pointed out, whenever communists make a lot of noise about something, that something always has internal contradictions.

As it turned out, the analysis by a Japanese scholar, Professor Yamada Saburo (Tokyo University) shows that average annual growth rates for North and South Korea in agricultural production from 1961 to 1972 were 3.68 percent for the ROK as opposed to 0.87 percent for North Korea.[24]

The recent much-celebrated "Chuche Farming Method," too, in reality is nothing more than "the right crop for the right land, plant breeding policy."[25]

Kim Il-song seems to be imitating a method which, in the past, resulted in failure in the Soviet Union. In theory, it works if plants are bred so that the right crop can be planted in the right land. But, as seen in Table 6 above, North Korea doesn't seem to be having much success in plant breeding. As in the Soviet Union of the 1960's, Kim Il-song in 1973 all at once demanded a movement to secure four billion heads of corn, but corn is weak before cold and wind and requires much fertilizer.

As expected, Kim Il-song claimed that from that year forth North Korea had been subjected to severe cold and drought, thus blaming climatic conditions for failure in corn growing he had demanded.

In 1976 the northern puppets made much noise that "since the end of June most regions have had the coldest temperatures in history, with 2° C at Changjin in South Hamgyong Province, 0° C at Paegam and 6° C in the northern part of the eastern coastline" while saying that along with the cold front the worst drought since 1918 continued and urging as a countermeasure a water supply command system.[26]

Also, it is known that during the 4 April 1977 13th plenum of the 5th Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party (KWP) under the topic "On Mobilizing the Whole Party, Whole State and Whole People to Vigorously Carry Out the Struggle to Prevent Drought Damage Caused by the Cold Front," it was decided to "Thoroughly Fulfill the Five Great Guidelines of Nature Rebuilding and Occupy Ahead of Time the Ten Million Ton Grain Height."[27]

The five great guidelines of nature rebuilding, which were instituted in 1976, include building fields and irrigation, arranging and improving land, building terraced fields, flood control forestation and land reclamation; it is said that following these guidelines the "water supply command system" was set up in all areas, while at the same time the whole party, whole military and whole people were mobilized to put primary effort into securing agricultural water and developing underground water such as making cisterns and digging wells, tanks and water pockets.

This must have made substantial contributions to North Korea's agricultural development. But, there are limits to policy and human labor and although North Korea must have had some success in moderating natural disasters, we cannot but question that with that kind of effort they completely overcame such bad natural and climatic conditions to achieve production volumes greater than the ROK.

According to Mr Ogata of Japan's NHK who visited North Korea in July 1977, the North Korean corn crop at that time was a total loss due to drought.[28]

(3) Other Claims and Related Speech and Conduct

(a) North Korea's Speech and Conduct Regarding Import and Export of Grain

As previously mentioned, in February 1978, the northern puppet KCNA reported that North Korea expected to export 500,000 tons of rice and corn to Indonesia and twenty-some other nations, that they exported each year tens of thousands of tons of rice more to Indonesia than in earlier years, with last year's exports reaching 100,000 tons and this year's over 200,000 tons.[29]

Is this because, as they claim, North Korea has a grain surplus? If this is so, why does North Korea have to import large quantities of wheat and wheat flour every year and why did it import large quantities of rice and corn from Thailand in 1978?

According to the statistics of the Japan Trade Promotion Association, North Korea, in spite of its foreign currency lack, has imported over $200,000,000 worth of wheat and wheat flour yearly for the past several years.[30]

Why does North Korea import large quantities of wheat and wheat flour while propagandizing large increases in food production and exports? Is it because of a shortage in foodstuffs? Is it because they export high quality rice and import inferior foreign grains? Or is it because of diplomatic concerns rising out of the ROK's long-term lending of rice to Indonesia?

Table 7 shows estimates of North Korea's grain imports for the last several years.

Table 7. North Korea's Grain Import and Export Activity (10,000 metric tons)

Year	Exports (*1)	Imports (*2)	Comparison
1971	15.0	27.6(?)	-12.6(?)
1972	12.0	30.2(15.0)	-18.2(-3.0)
1973	15.0	149.8(31.5)	-134.8(-16.5)
1974	20.0	138.0(76.5)	-118.0(-56.5)
1975		29.9(+7.0)	?
1976	2.5	25.2(29.5)	-22.7(-27.0)
1977	20.0	23.0( )	-3.0(?)
1978	50.0(planned)	22.0( )	?

(*1 = export quantities)
1971-1974: Koria Ronpi o (Japanese)
1976 : Weekly Anti-Communist Intelligence
1977 : Radio Pyongyang (18 February 1978)
1978 : Radio Pyongyang (13 February 1978) (no substantiating reports)
(*2 = import quantities--(   ) = U.S. intelligence sources)
1971-1976: Weekly Anti-Communist Intelligence
1977 : Weekly Central Intelligence
1978 : REUTER/HAPTONG Bangkok dateline 11/7/78, in 11/8/78 HANKUK ILBO

Even though Table 7 shows differences in North Korea's grain import and export activities according to the sources of information, with the exception of 1978's planned export figure, all show imports exceeding exports every year. Imports exceeded exports by 1,348,000 tons (or 165,000 tons) in 1973, by 1,188,000 tons (or 565,000 tons) in 1974, 227,000 tons (or 270,000 tons) in 1976.

1978 shows exports exceeding imports by 280,000 tons but North Korea's 500,000-ton export plan and 223,000-ton import plan have not been confirmed.[31]

Both import and export amounts show a tendency to decrease since 1975, is it because of a rapid increase in grain production? Or is it the result of a drain on foreign reserves as reported in the foreign press? Is it due to an increase in grain reserves for wartime use?[32]

(b) North Korea's Pledge to Increase Grain Reserves

On 15 January 1978 during the National Farm Family Meeting Kim Il-song said that "the American imperialists are waiting only for a chance to attack the North...we must prepare thoroughly for war in order to meet any sudden attack," while emphasizing the stockpiling of foodstuffs as war preparations.

Continuing, he said "because the workers did a good job of farming last year, the state stockpiled hundreds of thousands of tons of foodstuffs" and he also said "if this year we occupy the 'eight million tons of grain' height we will be able to stockpile another million tons of grain or more."[33]

If what Kim Il-song said is true, then North Korea stockpiled a million tons of grain in 1975 and hundreds of thousands of tons the previous year. This is because North Korea announced that it produced eight million tons of grain in 1975.

However, there is a problem here also. It is said that in July of 1975 Kim Il-song stated that the people's demand for that year was 4.5 million tons during talks with Utsunomiya (Japan).[34]

If this is so, what happened to the 2.5 million tons left after the people's demand of 4.5 million tons and the stockpiled one million tons of the total production of eight million tons?

Table 7 above shows North Korea's excess in imports. It is unbelievable that the northern puppets, drained of foreign reserves, would have imported large quantities of grain for animal feed and processing on top of grain stockpiles of hundreds of thousands of tons and a million tons.

If so, was it in order to give large quantities of food rations to the people?[35]

B. North Korea's Activities in Supplying Foodstuffs to the People

North Korea's activities in supplying foodstuffs to the people are known to be as shown in Table 8.

Table 8. North Korea's Food Supply Standards (per person per day)

Rank	Description	Supply Quantities(g)	Grain Type	Ratio of Non-Rice Grains
1	Kim Il-song, Kim Chong-il	No limit	Rice (Totally polished)	100% rice
2	High-ranking cadre & families	300-800	Rice (90% polished)	100% rice
3	Mid-ranking cadre & families	300-800	Rice: Non-Rice Grains	70:30
4	City residents & families of special districts	300-800	Rice: Non-Rice Grains	50:50
5	General workers & families	300-600	Rice: Non-Rice Grains	30:70
6	Concentration Camp Laborers	400-600	Non-Rice Grains	100% Mixed

Source: Evaluations by foreign journalists resident in Pyongyang (CHONGOSA CHARYO 13 Dec 77) [Intelligence Command Materials]

The supply activities shown in Table 8 are merely standards; according to defectors from the North, in 1966 and 1967 North Korea gave 700 grams per person per day, but that in 1968 using war preparations following the Pueblo incident as an excuse, the ration was cut to 600 grams and cut again by four days' portion per month for reunification rice reserves in 1972, and again in August 1978 the 300 grams alloted per day for infants was cut 100 grams.

Furthermore, it is said that the 50-50 ratio of rice to non-rice grain for the common people was lowered to 30-70 from January 1975, August 1976 when it was again lowered to 20-80, after which in 1977 when it was changed to the 0-100 "oksal" composed of corn meal and wheat flour.[36]

If so, what is the reason?

(c) The Rice Contribution Movement of the Chosen Soren in Japan

Beginning in 1977, the northern puppets order the Chosen Soren in Japan to collect and forward 480,000 tons of rice and it is a fact that part of the collected rice was sent to North Korea on a Japanese vessel departing Tokuyama harbor on 3 November 1977 (*1) the North Koreans again ordered that 450 sixty kilogram sacks of rice be collected and sent to the North by May 1978 (*2)--what could be the reason?[37]

What is the difference between the northern puppets' rice contribution order and import and the situation of the Chinese Communists in the 1960's when due to a severe food shortage they persuaded overseas Chinese to send aid rice to their relatives in China?

(d) Claims of Industrial Assistance to Agriculture

The northern puppets always present support from the cities and industrial sector as an element in North Korea's increased agricultural production. However, in North Korea, as of course in Communist China, whenever setbacks occur in economic planning the "back to the country" movements, that is, movements taking city people and factory workers to rural areas have been carried out.

As is widely known already, the North Korean economy has been on the verge of bankruptcy for the last several years. Masses of unemployed have appeared at all types of enterprises as a result of work reductions or stoppages due to severe shortages in materials. They have mobilized the unemployed workers and city people in the rural areas but have experienced great uproar because they had no funds to pay wages.

Because the workers who went to the rural areas could not be paid until their labor points were tabulated in the fall according to the harvest per p'yong, their families underwent great suffering. The workers did not want to go to the rural areas and the peasants did not want to accept city workers who did not know how to farm. The "Nature Rebuilding Movement" was, in fact, a movement to succor the unemployed.

It is known that following the 18 May 1978 "Panmunjom ax murder atrocity, the northern puppets, under the promulgation of a wartime mobilization order and the excuse of "evacuation" forced unemployed city workers and their families to move to rural areas. Also, it is said that at about this time oldsters and children gathered in front of North Korea's "state-operated" dining halls fighting for places just to eat whatever food was left uneaten by officials.[38]

If so, must we not consider the "city and industrial assistance to rural areas" to be just the opposite, i.e., "rural assistance to cities and industries?" Of course, at busy times city workers, soldiers and students go to the farms to help with transplanting and harvesting and it is true that factories send agricultural machinery to the villages.

In addition, North Korea brags about how the state buys a kilogram of rice from the peasants for 60 chon and supplies it to workers for 8 chon. The 52 chon loss is the "state's burden." However, in fact the purchase price of 60 chon does not equal the cost of production. And, the 52 chon loss is made up by exploitation of labor.

North Korea, under its state monopoly capitalist planned economic system, exploits the peasants and the workers through the "state purchase system" and the "distribution system."

Grain is a source for military and industrial buildup and a means to mobilize labor. Kim Il-song emphasizes, "The problem of eating will of course be solved if we produce much grain; it would also give us cannons, tanks, airplanes and the socialist patriotic ideology."[39] As will be analyzed in detail later on, the North Korean economy cannot operate without grain.

At the time he presented his "rural thesis" in February 1964, Kim Il-song claimed openly that cities and industries must help rural areas but in private he is said to have "stressed the fact that in industrially underdeveloped North Korea, the rural areas must provide industrial resources."[40]

At any rate, this will be examined again later; but, whenever industry is stagnant or a new economic plan is launched, the North Koreans always announce abundant grain harvests, after which rural areas always experience food riots. Thus, how are the problematic North Korean claims seen by both domestic and foreign observers?

II. The Discord in Domestic and Foreign Views on the North Korean Food Situation and Its Causes

As previously stated, domestic and foreign views on the North Korean food situation can probably be divided into three groups: Those who generally follow the northern puppet position, those who see the figures reported by the northern puppets as pure propaganda and those who pay no attention to North Korean figures and attempt their own independent estimates. This section will look at the representative examples of each of these views.

1. Those Agreeing With Northern Puppet Claims

First, there are many leftists among those who have views on the North Korean food situation consistent with the claims made by the northern puppets. For example, Ko Sung-hyo's book "CHOSEN SHAKAISHUGI KEIZAIRON ["On Choson's Socialist Economy," Tokyo, Nihon Hyoronsha, 1973] claims in "Kongmul saengsan ui ch'ui" [Shifts in Grain Production] (p. 55) that "based on the Korean Central Yearbook, 'reports' from North Korean cadre and 'other public materials' the 'food problem in North Korea has been completely resolved'" while citing North Korea's grain production output; furthermore, the book praises the northern puppets, saying, "Inasmuch as the republican northern half was separated from the food belt of South Korea by national division and North Korea was generally considered to be unsuitable for agriculture because of natural and climatic conditions, this must in truth be considered an epochal turn of events."

According to the materials and the author's calculations, in 1962 North Korea was already producing five million tons and although he says that production suffered "stagnation and reduction" for several years after 1963, he calculates a production of 4.52 million tons in 1965, 4.41 million in 1966, 5.12 million in 1967 and 5.68 million in 1968.

If so, considering the North Korean population of the time and even granting Kim Il-song's claim of yearly consumption of 300 kilograms per person, North Korea must have been able to export and stockpile much food; why doesn't Ko provide an explanation for this?

Also, the February 1976 edition of the professional journal on North Korean problems, the KITA CHOSEN KENKYU, quoted a statement from Kim Il-song's New Year's Address contained in the February edition of the Japanese magazine SEIKAI that "4.8 million tons is enough for our population of 16 million at our annual per capita consumption of 300 kilograms," and while kindly annotating Kim's remarks, accepted the northern puppet figures as published, saying, "Inasmuch as Kim Il-song has made it clear in his New Year's Address that last year North Korea harvested 7.7 million tons of grain, they should be able to stockpile two million tons even after exporting one million."[41]

Subsequently, of course, the KITA CHOSEN KENKYU came to mistrust northern puppet figures, but by supporting the northern puppet claims the journal's earlier views constitute an obstacle to resolving the North Korean foodstuff problem.[42]

2. Those Who Mistrust North Korean Figures

Typical of this group is a statement found in a research report of the U.S. CIA. The report points out, In the case of North Korea, not only do they report fragmentary economic figures, but those they do report are selected for propaganda and are believed to be exaggerated. However, information at hand indicates that in the development race of the past 10 years, South Korea has surpassed North Korea."[43]

Nonetheless, in a section titled "Agricultural and Rural Development" this report judges that North Korea is ahead of South Korea in the rate of grain production increase, with North Korea at 5.4 percent (population increase 3 percent) and South Korea at 2.1 percent (population increase 2 percent).[44]

Also, this report states that although the per capita grain consumption of both North and South is similar, South Koreans eat twice as much rice as the North Koreans, who rigorously control rice consumption and use corn as their main food grain (corn accounts for 55 percent of North Korea's grain production, rice for 40 percent); the report analyzes that "reports of North Korean food shortages probably stem from this."[45]

This report said that following sharp decreases in the early 1970's, North Korea has recently shown noteworthy increases. Somehow, things don't seem to fit.

In addition, Japan's KITA CHOSEN KENKYU stated, "North Korea's statistical figures have little reliability...the report that 8 million tons of grain were produced this year is also not very reliable, and although it was reported that the 1974 harvest was 7 million tons, during the agricultural conference held 8-15 January of the next year, it was said 'last year we reaped unprecedented great crops but we lost much grain because the strain on transportation did not permit us to gather grain from the fields.' Such facts reveal the unreliability of the figures from the Central Statistics Bureau."[46]

Of course this is beyond the scope of the journal's report, but it only showed mistrust of North Korea's statistics--it did not explain the matter of domestic and foreign interest, the problem of North Korea's "grain production" and its "trends."

3. Those Who Estimate Independently

This is the standpoint which, like those above, disbelieves North Korea's claims and statistics while following its own approach to establish an independent view on the North Korean food situation.

A selective comparison of four of these proves to be quite interesting.

Table 9. Some Estimates of North Korean Foodgrain Production (10,000 metric tons)

Year	North Korean Figures	A	B	C	D
1974	700	490	476	440(453)	428(558)
1975	770	540	487	442(456)	436(568)
1976	800	560	510	454(469)	443(579)
1977	850				449(587)

Sources: A--Above-cited U.S. CIA report

B--Yi Won-chun (Professor, Air Force Academy), PUKHAN [North Korea], Seoul, Pukhan yongu-so, December 1977, p 76.

C--Hong Ki-ch'ang, Analysis of North and South Korea's Agricultural Base, p 105. (figures in parentheses include grain plus fruit and tubers)

D--PUKHAN [North Korea] March 1978, p 119. (figures in parentheses include coarse grains)

First of all, there were some points in common among the several features of the various estimates in the table, including: One, production is less than announced figures; two, North Korea's production figures have shown sustained growth; and three, per capita production is higher than South Korea. Secondly, as seen in the A-B-C-D order, the U.S. CIA figures are highest. Third, "C" speculates that after 1974, North Korea's announced figures have included rruits and even vegetables, in addition to grain and tubers. Fourth, "C" and "D" make it clear that North Korea's grain concept is a "coarse grain" concept. Of course, "A" and "B" indicated awareness of this in their explanatory narrative.

However, the problems to be looked at here are as follows.

First, if North Korea's per capital production is higher than the ROK's and if it shows smooth growth every year, why has the diet of the people living in North Korea continuously deteriorated?

All four seem to be aware of stockpiling and export as reasons; however, why then does North Korea, which has shortages of foreign exchange and foreign credit, have an excess of grain imports each year, as we saw in the preceding chapter?

Second, although the differing approaches used by each may be a contributing factor, what is the source of the discord in their estimates and what effect can it have?

Third, each seems to have evaluated North Korea's food production growth as smooth; is that not because they have introduced some sort of tabular approach of their own based on North Korean figures?

In particular, "D" selected the formula "arable land area multiplied by harvest per chongbo divided by ratio per crop equals production"; what is the basis for the harvest per chongbo figure used here?

Was consideration given to the differences between North and South in systems and policies and in productivity of land?

The previously cited monograph by Professor Yamada surveyed North and South in AJIA SHOKOKU NOGYO NO TOCHI SEISANSEI [The agricultural land productivity of Asian countries]. The agricultural production of North and South in 1963 (1961-65 average) was 4.67:3.78 per hectare of arable land and in 1970, 5.60:4.01 (1968-72 average), so that the ROK had an annual 2.57 percent rate of increase as opposed to .85 percent for North Korea.[47]

Fourth, each example recognizes only the difference in the "grain" production of North and South Korea's "grain production" concepts and are totally unaware of the differences in the idea of "production" and of the variances in harvest statistics that arise out of the differing "production" concepts. As will be examined later, unlike our concept of "harvest" which means that "in the granary," the North Korean concept of "production" is a "standing grain" concept which is known to lead to overestimates of 20 percent or more over conventional harvest concepts.

As seen above, the failure of the examples to agree and the feeling of overestimation apparently derive from differing degrees of awareness of the gap between the "grain production" concepts of North and South.

In particular, the U.S. CIA report totally disregards the differences between North and South to hold the per capita consumption of grain in both North and South to be the same, as well as estimating North Korea's food production growth rate to exceed that of the ROK.

According to Professor Yamada's monograph, the combined production indices for North and South in 1963 (1961-65 average) and 1970 (1968-72 average) were 20.42:14.67 and 26.30:15.59 respectively (1963 Japan = 100); the ROK also led North Korea in growth rate during that time at 3.68 versus .87 (Japan--2.34).[48]

That is not to say that Professor Yamada's analysis (which used mostly FAO materials) is totally correct, but at any rate it does not seem unreasonable to say that the discord in domestic and foreign views on the North Korean food situation stems from difference of the North, which impedes an understanding of information, as well as from the shortage of information itself.

Thus under current conditions, correctly understanding the differing "foodgrain production" concepts of North and South and the resulting statistical differences is the most crucial task in the study of the North Korean food problem.

III. The Different Foodgrain Concepts and Statistical Differences of North and South

As previously noted, each year North Korea's announced foodgrain production figures are similar to the ROK's figures; what could be the reason for this?

The heterogenization created in North and South during the past 30 years has resulted in a situation where we cannot even understand each other's terminology when discussing institutions and ideas. This includes many new words but there are many words used in common whose content has become totally different.

The North Korean terms "food grain," "production" and "statistics," used throughout this study, can be considered typical examples. As will be seen in detail later on, there are political, psychological, tactical and magical [sic] concepts latent in North Korea's terminology. The attempt to deal with this terminology as equivalent to our own concepts in spite of the differences is at the root of the problem. Thus we must first grasp the North Korean concepts of "food grain," "production" and "statistics" in order to approach the North Korean food problem, especially the views of the North Korean food situation. This is because, as is analyzed later, the effects on political and psychological warfare and the grain production statistical differences which derive from the differences in understanding of these terms between North and South are tremendous.

1. The Differing "Foodgrain" Concepts

A. The Meaning of "Foodgrain"

The table below gives the definitions for "foodgrain" given in the KUGO SAJON [National Lanbuage Dictionary] published in the ROK and the CHOSONO SAJON [Korean Language Dictionary] published in North Korea in order to compare the meanings of "foodgrain" in North and South.

Table 10. Comparison of the Meanings of Foodgrain

Dictionary	Definition	Meaning
ROK (KUGO SAJON)	1. grain with all empty husks and debris removed 2. winnowed grain	1 & 2 = select grain (uniformity)
North Korea (CHOSONO SAJON)	1. grain 2. grain with all empty husks and debris removed 3. winnowed grain	1 = coarse grain concept 2 & 3 = select grain concept (duality)

Sources: (ROK) All domestic "national language dictionaries"

North Korea) "Modern Korean Language Dictionary" [Hyondae Chosonmal sajon] (Pyongyang, Academy of Social Sciences, 9 Sep 1968)

As seen in the above table, the meaning of "food grain" in the ROK has been standardized, whereas the North has the dual concept of coarse grain and select grain. Which of these does North Korea use?

B. The Scope of North Korea's "Food grain"

As seen in Table 11, North Korea's CHOSON MUNHWA-O SAJON [Dictionary of the Modern Korean Language] and KYONGJE SAJON [Economic Dictionary] reveal the North Korean "food grain" concept to be "coarse grain."

Table 11. North Korea's Foodgrain Types

Category	Definition	Concept
Meaning of Foodgrain	All grains such as rice, wheat, corn, barley kaoliang, millet, soybeans and buckwheat	Coarse grain
Types of Foodgrain	Rice--the main grain Dry field grains Early crops: Wheat, barley, kyumil Late crops: Corn, kaoliang, millet,	Five grains *Others become a problem later on

[Table 11 continued on following page]

Reasons for North Korea being ahead in per capita grain production include the argument that after liberation the Hamhung fertilizer plant, that had supplied fertilizer for the whole country, now supplied North Korea only and the assertion that the ROK's population was rapidly increased by refugees from the North and by returning overseas Koreans. However, in spite of the fact that a more rigorous analysis of the productivity of refugees from the North and aspects of system, policy and technology should have been done, this logic prevails even today.

The following table will present the conversion of North Korea's announced foodgrain production statistics to our concept in order to see what emerges in relation to this problem.

Table 14. North Korea's Foodgrain Production Figures Adjusted According to the ROK Concept (Hypothetical) (10,000 metric tons)

Year	Grain Type: Conv Rate:	Rice 72%	Corn/Bean 100%	Mix-grain 68%	Tubers(*1) 21%	N.K. Rate	Total	Variance	%
1944		100.8	32.4	87.9	77.5	20.6	241.7	61.9	26%
(converted figure)		(72.5)	(32.4)	(59.7)	(15.2)	26%	(179.8)		
1946		105.2	29.9	40.2	[49.2]	15.2	189.8	46.6	25%
		(75.7)	(29.9)	(27.3)	(10.3)	30.9%	(143.2)		
1947		110.1	38.3	43.5	[54.4]	15.0	206.9	49.5	24%
		(79.2)	(38.3)	(29.5)	(11.4)	27%	(157.4)		
1948		135.0	52.8	57.3	[69.7]	8.7	266.8	63.3	24%
		(97.2	(52.8)	(38.9)	(14.6)	12%	(203.5)		
1949		115.8	56.6	70.9	[78.2]	22.1	265.4	61.8	23%
		(83.4)	(56.6)	(47.2)	(16.4)	29%	(203.6)		
1951		93.5	60.2	59.1	[58.2]	12.8	226.0	46.3	21%
		(67.3)	(60.2	(40.1	(12.1)	22%	(179.7)		
1954		102.5	50.3	55.6	[64.7]	14.0	223.0	50.9	23%
		(73.8)	(50.3)	(33.8)	(14.0)	21%	(172.1)		
1955		124.2	48.9	51.4	[61.9]	9.5	234.0	47.9	21%
		(89.4)	(48.9)	(34.9)	(12.9)	15%	(186.1)		
1956		139.2	99.0	37.1	[94.8]	12.0	287.3	53.2	20%
		(90.2	(99.0	(25.1)	(19.9)	12%	(234.2)		
1957		145.9	133.6	27.0	[118.6]	13.6	320.1	40.5	17%
		(104.8)	(133.6)	(16.3)	(24.9)	12%	(279.6)		

[Table 14 continued on following page]

Category	Definition	Concept
	broomcorn, Japanese millet	
	Legumes: Soybeans, red beans, mung beans	
	Others: Buckwheat, others*	

Sources: (Meaning) North Korea's "Dictionary of the Modern Korean Language p 943. (Department of Language and Literature Editing, Academy of Social Sciences, 10 May 1973)

(Types) North Korea's "Economic Dictionary Two," p 779 "Food grain Production Sector" (Academy of Social Sciences, 15 August 1970)

The above table shows that these sources, North Korea's standard language dictionaries, define "food grain" as coarse grain, a concept which covers "dry field grains" as well as "paddy rice."

However, the problem here is what does "other" mean, and are tubers (yams, potatoes) included? Since the question of whether tubers should be included in "foodgrain" seems to be a matter of dispute within North Korea itself, this question will be considered on the basis of other materials.

C. The Problem of Including Tubers in Foodgrains

The northern puppets' "food grain" production reporting activities of the past 33 years can be divided into five stages.

Table 12. North Korea's Agricultural Production Reporting

Stage	Content of Report	Sources
Stage 1 (1944-57)	Foodgrain total (rice, corn, wheat, millet, kaoliang, soybeans) Tobacco Vegetables Tubers Potatoes (from among tubers) Fodder (1949-57	Korean Central Yearbook, 1958 p 196
Stage 2 (1958-60)	Foodgrain total (not including tubers) Rice Corn Wheat Millet Kaoliang Soybeans	Korean Central Yearbook, 1959-61
Stage 3 (1961-62)	Foodgrain total (not including tubers)	Korean Central Yearbook, 1962-63

[Table 12 continued on following page]

Stage	Content of Report	Sources
Stage 4 (1963-73	No report	
Stage 5 (1974-77)	Foodgrain total (indications of inclusion of tubers)	Kim Il-song's New Year Address and speech at agriculture meet

*Refer to Kim Il-song's 8 January 1975 speech at the "National Agriculture Meet" (North Korea's Central Broadcasting, 16 January 1975)

As seen in the above table, the northern puppets announced at the second stage that root crops were not included in food grains, but if yearly total food grain production is compared with total production by grain type the only two years in which the two match are 1958 and 1959 while in 1960 the total for grain types was 720,000 tons short and in 1960 the breakdown by grain type was not announced.

Of these the 720,000 tons shortage in 1960 production totals by grain type is believed to equal that year's tuber production (figures not published).[49]

In the first stage (1946-57), it is seen that the northern puppets included tubers (conversion rations 10%-36%) in foodgrain statistics.[50]

According to defector testimony, from 1958 when the total collective farm system was instituted until recent years, tubers (grain conversion rate: 25%) were forcibly included in rations.[51]

At any rate, the above-cited northern puppet materials and the testimony of the defectors indicate that with the exception of 1957 and 1958, root crops were included in the foodgrain concept. This shows that although North and South both use the same term, "food grain," the meanings they assign to this term are quite different.

D. The Etymology of North Korea's "Food grain"

Many of the terms used in North Korea after liberation are loan words from the Soviet Union and Communist China.

The grain concept in such materials as the USSR annual (Japanese edition) and the Communist Chinese annual (Japanese edition) is the standing grain concept and the types of grain listed are the same as those listed in the above-cited North Korean "Economic Dictionary."[52]

Furthermore, according to North Korea's CHORO TAE SAJON [Korean-Russian Dictionary] (Academy of Social Science, 1976), "food grain" (p 496) is "zerno" in Russian; in Japanese, "zerno" is "kernel grain" [ryokoku]

(ROSHIA-GO JITEN [Russian Dictionary] Tokyo, Hakuaisha, p 362). Thus the "kernel" [ryo] character in kernel grain has come to mean "food" [al] in "food grain" [algok] and its scope has been transformed to the five grain concept. Thus it seems safe to say that North Korea's term for foodgrain, as commonly used by the communists, introduces a socialist content into a national word.

Because North Korea's external expression is identical to our traditional term for food grain, it is not unusual for lay people, and even specialists and scholars, to be deceived or confused. In this light, it can be said that like their terms "democracy," "peace" and "freedom," "food grain" too is a political and psychological warfare term craftily designed to deceive and confuse. The following statistical figures show just how much the content of North Korea's term "food grain" differs from ours even though it seems the same from outside.

2. Variances in Grain Statistics Resulting From the Heterogenization of the Food Grain Concept

Of late domestic academic opinion seems to agree that the heterogenization of North and South now constitutes the primary hindrance to national reunification.

Looking at the grain statistical variances resulting from the heterogenization of the "food grain" concept, it seems that it can be used as one example quantitatively demonstrating the differing consciousness of North and South. That is, if North Korea's "food grain" (rice, corn, soybeans, and other unhusked grain) were converted into our "food grain" (rice, corn, soybeans, tubers, other husked grains), the following numerical variances would result.

Table 12. Numerical Differences Resulting from North and South Korean Concepts of Foodgrain (Select grain conversion rate)

Division	Rice	Corn/Beans	Various Grains	Tubers
North Korea (coarse)	100%	100%	100%	25%
ROK (Select)	72%	100%	68%	21.1%

Refer to ROK CIA materials and op cit "Comparison of North and South Korea's Creation of Agricultural Bases"

As can be seen in the above table, when expressed in numbers, the North and South Korean "food grain" concepts give rise to tremendous differences in all grain types except tubers.

If these differing foodgrain concepts were standardized according to our concept, only about 72% of North Korea's rice would be considered as select grain, 100% of its corn and beans, 68% of its other grains, and 21.1% of its tubers.

When converted to our "food grain" concept, North Korea's grain production figures must be greatly reduced. For example, in 1946 North Korea's foodgrain production was 1,898,000 tons, and production by grain type was announced at 1,052,000 of paddy rice, 156,000 tons of corn, 143,000 tons of beans, 402,000 tons of various grains and 492,000 tons of tubers; the following table is a conversion of these figures to our "food grain" concept according to the conversion rate in Table 12.

Table 13. Conversion of North Korea's Food Grain Production Figures for 1946

Grain Type:	Total	Rice	Corn/Beans	Other Grains	Tubers*
Reported figures (10,000 metric tons)	189.8	105.2	29.9	40.2	(49.2)
Conversion Rate	74.4%	72%	100%	68%	(21.1%)
Conversion Figures	143.2	75.7	29.9	27.3	(10.3)

Source: See p 196 of 1958 Korean Central Yearbook

*The table shows that North Korea made up the difference in its 1946 total food grain production figures (1,898,000 tons) and its combined grain type figures (1,753,000 tons) by converting (at about 30%) its tuber production figure (492,000 tons)

If we convert North Korea's 1946 food grain production of 1,898,000 tons to our foodgrain concept, it becomes 1,432,000 tons. Thus, when seen through the ROK concept, North Korea's foodgrain production is 466,000 tons, or 25.6 percent over actual figures.

If one looks at the North's food grain production figures with our concept, unaware of differences in content and assuming that identical terms have identical meanings, it would be easy to delude oneself that North Korea is indeed a "garden of roses." For example, in 1946 the ROK's foodgrain production by our concept was 2.6 million tons; if no consideration is given to differences in content and the terms are assumed to be identical, comparison of our foodgrain production with that of North Korea shows a difference of only 710,000 tons between the South's 2,600,000 tons and the North's 1,890,000 tons for that year.

However, when compared by our concept the difference between North and South in foodgrain production becomes 2.60 million tons versus 1.43 million tons, that is 1.17 million tons. But in the same year South Korea's population with 19,698,000 while North Korea's was 9,257,000 for a ratio of 2 to 1, meaning that at this time North Korea was ahead of the ROK in per capita production.[53]

Year	Grain Type:	Rice	Corn/Bean	Mix-grain	Tubers(*1)		Total	Variance	%
	Conv Rate:	72%	100%	68%	21%	N.K. Rate			
1958	(converted figure)	172.3	161.5	36.2	?	?	370.0	70.1	19%
		(114.0)	(161.5)	(24.6)	?	?	300.1		
1959		158.6	148.1	33.3	?	?	340.0	75.3	23%
		(114.0)	(148.1)	(22.6)	?	?	(264.7)		
1960		153.5	118.4	35.9	?	?	380.3	(*4) 137.0	35%
		(100.5)	(118.4)	(24.4)	?	?	(243.3)		
1961 (*4)		?	?	?	?	?	483.0	?	?
1962		?	?	?	?	?	500.0	?	?
1963-73 (*6)		?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
1974		?	?	?	?	?	700.0	?	?
1975		?	?	?	?	?	770.0	?	?
1976		?	?	?	?	?	800.0	?	?
1977		?	?	?	?	?	850.0	?	?

Sources: North Korea's Foodgrain Production Figures: 1944--57, op cit "Korean Central Yearbook," 1958, p 196; 1958, "Korean Central Yearbook," 1959; 1959-62, "Korean Central Yearbook," 1963; 1974, 1976, 1977, op cit Yi Chong-ok speech; 1975, Kim Il-song's 1976 New Year Address.

(*1) Tuber production figure conversion:

--Figures in ( ) are from application of ROK's standard conversion rate of 21% to North Korea's announced figures.

--However, as seen in the table, North Korea is believed to have used conversion rates varying between 21 and 30.9 percent between 1944 and 1954.

--Inconsistencies in North Korea's tuber conversion rates are through to be caused by attempts to manage total production figures.

--Post-1955 sharp decreases in the tuber conversion rate seem to be because of emphasis on increased rice and corn production.

--After 1956 corn production increased greatly.

--From 1958 to 1962, even though Kim Il-song announced that tuber production was not included in foodgrain production, it is noteworthy that 1960 total production by grain type fell 725,000 tons short of the total foodgrain production figure. This will be explained later. (Total production was false.)

(*2) It is noteworthy that except for 35 percent in 1960, the percentage difference between our food grain concept and that of North Korea was 23.5 percent or more.

(*3) It is also noteworthy that the difference when converting North Korea's foodgrain production figures to our concept averages over 500,000 tons. This will be discussed later, but in spite of the fact that North Korea's food supplies are insufficient they always have offered to give food aid to the South in order to hide their own shortages and boast of their superiority over the South.

(*4) It is noteworthy that after 1958 the difference was over 700,000 tons; the story behind that (growing severity of false statistical methods after beginning the collective farm system) will be explained later.

(*5) In 1961 a leaping gain of 1,000,000 tons over the previous year was announced; however, it is noteworthy that figures on production by crop type were not announced.

(*6) It is noteworthy that following the announcement of the achievement of the 5 million ton goal in 1962 there was no foodgrain production announcement for 11 years from 1963 through 1973.

(*7) From 1974 the total production figure was again announced, but it is noteworthy that the trend toward increased production was very pronounced.

(*Other) --Increasing proportions of rice production give more reliable differences.

--The table used conversion rates of 72 percent and 21 percent for rice and tubers respectively, so that the conversion figures may be high, if anything.

At any rate, there are many things worthy of note in the above table and analytic notes, but the thing to remember here is that when North Korea's announced food grain production figures are converted to our foodgrain concept, the yearly average difference for the convertible years, 1946-1960, was over 23 percent.

Looking at this by period, the period right after land reform (1946-49) saw a yearly average of 24 percent, the period of the Korean War 21 percent, and the post-war period (1954-58) 20 percent, showing a trend toward closing the gap; however, following the institution of the collective farm system (1959-60), the yearly average jumped to 30 percent (23 percent in 1957, 35 percent in 1960.

3. The Tactical Intent of North Korea's Food Grain Concept

As seen in the preceding tables, the difference in foodgrain concepts between North and South resulted in an average annual numerical difference of 700,000 tons (1946-60); there are three purposes hidden in the North Korean concept.

Specifically, the first is propaganda versus the South, the second covering up internal weaknesses and the third exploiting the peasants.

For example, in 1958 when North Korea announced that it had completed two and one-half years ahead of time its first five year plan (actually abandoned), they began to announce extremely high foodgrain production figures, apparently as a means of mobilizing domestic resources following a sharp decrease in aid from the Soviet Union.

This will be examined again later on, but it seems that the northern puppets claimed that foodgrain production had sharply increased whenever they began a new economic plan period or their economy encountered difficulties such as in 1956, the first year of their first five year plan, 1958 when they abandoned that plan, 1961 when they began their first seven year plan and 1974 when they apparently abandoned their six-year plan; this seems to have had its purpose in the exploitation of the peasants for the mobilization of domestic resources.

Furthermore, between 1957 and 1968, North Korea offered rice aid to the ROK five times. Each time they extorted rice from the peasants while propagandizing their superiority of the collective farm system.

However, according to the testimony of defectors, each time food shortages in North Korea were severe and the peasants suffered the unrewarded extortion of foodstuffs under the name of aid rice. In this light, North Korea's foodgrain concept can be said to be a means of communist propaganda, of hiding the domestic food problem and especially of exploiting the peasants for the mobilization of domestic resources.

These means used by North Korea became even more clear when we look at their food grain "production" concept and its statistical figures.

IV. North and South Korea's Differing Foodgrain "Production" Concepts and Statistical Differences

1. North and South Korea's Differing Food Grain "Production" Concepts

The differentiation between North and South can be seen in "production" concepts as well as in "food grain" concepts.

When we usually speak of grain production, we mean "harvest," this is, as the characters say, the grain brought inside from the fields. That is also the meaning of the select grain concept.

But in North Korea, production means the fruition prior to harvest, i.e., standing grain. There is some truth in this. That is because they regard such sources of decrease between fruit and storage as rats, birds, insects, spillage and others as management problems, not production problems.

This production concept of North Korea seems also to have been brought in from the Soviet Union. It is said that the former Soviet premier Malenkov emphasized in an August 1953 speech to the Presidium, "The incorrect conventional method of estimating grain and other agricultural production which relies solely on calculations of fruition rather than on actual harvests must be done away with."[54]

In his 1975 speech at the "National Agricultural Meeting," Kim Il-song also is said to have stated, "Last year we had unprecedented bountiful harvests, but because of the transportation shortage we were unable to move all the grain from the fields and thus lost much grain." This clearly shows what the North Korean production concept is.[55]

In addition, you cannot find the term "food grain harvest" in North Korea's public documents--they all use "food grain production." Thus there is no question but that this differentiation in "food grain production" concepts between North and South has brought about a difference in "food grain production" statistics.

It can be said that North Korea's "food grain production" is used for external psychological war purposes and for purposes of exploiting the peasants; this is confirmed in their statistics concept and examples of their statistical manipulation.

2. The Nature and Functions of North Korea's Food Grain Production Statistics

A. The Political Propagandadistic Nature

According to the testimony of Mr Choe Hong who, before defecting to the South on 8 June 1961, was interpreter for the former Soviet advisor Maksim [phonetic] at the northern puppet Central Statistics Bureau, "Statistics are an important political tool in the socialist state, and North Korea is no exception."

The following is the concrete testimony which he presented.

"Whenever North Korea thinks it necessary to achieve a political goal or carry out party policy, it always makes exaggerated reports. That is, when a task presented by the KWP for domestic policy is not carried out properly or when the party propagandizes to raise the morale of the people, exaggerated reports are made even though the economy might be stagnant. Externally the purpose of this exaggerated reporting is to establish prestige vis-a-vis capitalist states and underdeveloped states and to demonstrate the superiority of the socialist system, and internally to give the people faith in the party and confidence in the economic plan. In North Korea exaggerated reports have always been used in the production figures in such sectors as agricultural production, building materials, knitted goods and secondary foodstuffs, which are directly related to the people's livelihood; there has been no exaggerated reporting of products not directly related to livelihood such as electricity, maritime products and others. These exaggerated reports are put out by the Central Statistics Bureau under the agreement of the head of the concerned ministry and the responsible party central department head, and under the sanction of the responsible vice-minister and the chairman of the State Planning Committee. The responsibility for the execution of the plan for that plan-year for the sectors affected by exaggerated reporting is borne by the party and is reflected even in bottom-level organs."

In summary, inasmuch as North Korea's statistics are of a political nature, when necessary, false reports are fabricated; their purpose is to propagandize the superiority of the socialist system externally while promoting faith in the party and elevating the people's morale internally. This method is commonly used for sectors directly related to the people's livelihood such as agricultural products, building materials, knitted goods and secondary foodstuffs.

This can be considered living proof which explains through experience North Korea's statistics concept. As already noted, in the case of agricultural products they use such political statistics as seen before in similar terminology like "food grain" or "production" to disguise their plotting. That is, in the case of "food grain production," they mean not actual harvests but rather estimates of preharvest fruition. Thus it is known that the statistical difference resulting from the heterogenization of our harvest concept and their production concept is about a 20 percent overestimation on their part.[56]

But, this USSR-type statistical method is not well known. Thus there is no doubt that the exaggeration of production stemming from their statistical method is used for foreign and domestic propaganda.

B. The Peasant Exploitation Function of Food Grain Production

Since the Communist Party always bases its collection from the peasants of a fixed rate tax-in-kind derived from their "foodgrain production" concept's preharvest fruition calculation in order to secure "state management grain" (military rations, emergency rations, non-peasant food distribution and export grain) and funds for irrigation fees, cultivation fees and management funds (joint savings, social/cultural fund, fodder fund, fertilizer loans and seed loans), the burden on the peasants is always 20 percent greater than it would be if it were based on actual harvests.

The following table is an illustration of the northern puppets' exploitation of the peasants at the Chomch'on-ri Cooperative Farm in Paekch'on County.

Table 15. Aspects of the Northern Puppets' Exploitation of the Peasants (%)

		Period			
Classification	1946-55	1955-59	1959-64	1968	Recently
Tax-in-kind	25	20	9.2	Terminated	-
Irrigation fees				7	7
Cultivation fees				8	8
Joint savings	12.5	12.5	22.5	10	10
Social/cultural savings	2.5	2.5	5.0	10.0	10.0
Fodder fund				3	3
Fertilizer loans	4	4	4	10	10
Seed loans	2	2	2	2	2
Reunification rice	Occasionally	Increased		"	"
Totals	46.0	40.0	42.7	50.0	50.0

Source: National Reunification Academy, March 1978 "Current Affairs Intelligence Materials" p 27

As seen in the above table, in the case of the "Chomch'on-ri Cooperative Farm," the peasants burden is from 46.0 to 50.0 percent, but since it is really 20 percent greater than the formal numbers, it is much greater than the table shows.

Furthermore, there are several things to be pointed out here, including first of all, at the time of the land reform (5 March 1946) under the pretext of the "democratic revolution" the northern puppets evicted all individual landlords and in place of the tenants' rent levied a 25 percent tax-in-kind; testimony from refugees of the time showed that in face because they levied this tax-in-kind according to their "production concept" it actually reached about 50 percent.

Secondly, the northern puppets, who in 1959 forcefully carried out their collective farm system and became in name and in fact monopoly landlords, proclaim that they lowered the tax-in-kind to 9.2 percent but by raising the cooperative farms' operational funds from 15 percent to 27.5 percent (joint savings, social/cultural fund) they actually increase the peasants' total burden to 42.7 percent.

Thirdly, the northern puppets proclaimed in 1968 that they completely abolished the tax-in-kind, but at the same time they newly established in its place the irrigation fee, cultivation fee and the fodder fund while raising the cultural fund and the fertilizer loans to in effect increase the total burden to 50 percent.

Fourth, the northern puppets, as if afraid this were not enough, occasionally collect, without compensation, grain under the name of reunification rice.

Fifth, in addition, the northern puppets forcibly collect the total remnants of a (formal) consumption portion of their distribution amount through their "purchasing work." This burden is increased as the northern puppets increase "production."

Sixth, as already analyzed, the northern puppets seem to establish high food grain production statistics whenever they need an increase in the mobilization of internal resources.

The northern puppets' "food grain production statistics," which depend on calculations of coarse grain and standing grain, have the purpose of extorting the peasants for the mobilization of domestic resources in addition to the external psychological purpose.

3. The Food Grain Production Statistical Methods of Communist Countries and Their Examples

The communist statistical concept may fool unknowing outsiders, but it is resented by the peasants subjected to it. Therefore, we can find examples where, in order to direct the resentment and dissatisfaction of their peasants toward previous dictators and away from themselves, succeeding dictators of communist states have criticized the standing grain method of calculation of their predecessors while exposing the resultant statistical falsity. We have already noted the fact that in August 1953 at the Presidium Malenkov criticized the conventional methods of grain production statistics which relied on the standing grain calculation method.

Subsequently in August of 1958 at the Presidium Krushchev revealed Malenkov's announcement (at the 19th general meeting of the Communist Party held during Stalin's regime) of 1952 harvests at 131 million tons to be false and the true grain production to be 99.81 million tons.[57]

The difference between the standing grain calculation method and the actual harvest exposed by Krushchev was 25 percent. Also, such examples can also be found in Communist China. It is said that the Central Committee Meeting of the Chinese Communist Party held from 2 to 16 August 1959 at Lushan, Kiangshi roughly 8 months after Mao Zedong has resigned as chairman on 18 December 1958 announced that the 1958 grain harvest "was reported somewhat greater than it actually was and must be corrected."

It is said that the statement issued by that meeting, made public on 26 August of the same year, said that the "corrected figure" was 254 million tons, not 375 million tons.

It is said that the exaggerated figure was that presented by Premier Zhou Enlai at the People's Assembly in April 1959 while Mao Zedong was in office as chairman.[58]

As seen above, in the case of Communist China the difference between the standing grain calculation method and actual harvest was 35 percent. There has yet to be an announcement of this type in North Korea.

However, according to the testimony of Ch'oe Hong-hui whom we have mentioned earlier (former interpreter for the Soviet advisor "Maksim" to the northern puppet Central Statistics Bureau), the North Koreans use other political methods in addition to the standing grain calculation method, so it would seem that the difference between North Korea's "food grain production statistics" and actual harvests are even greater than in the Soviet Union or China.

The following is a quotation of Mr Ch'oe's testimony in this regard.

"In 1960 when Pak Chong-ae was head of the subcommittee for agriculture of the KWP Central Committee and Han Chong-chong was the minister of the Agriculture Ministry, the Agriculture Ministry came up with a statistical figure of 3.8 million tons for the 1960 foodgrain harvest prediction. Han Chong-chong, using this figure, reported at the 1960 year-end party congress (*1) that they had fulfilled the foodgrain production plan of 3.8 million tons for the year while claiming that in 1961 they could produce an additional one million tons. The party congress accepted these figures and established a 1961 goal of 4.8 million tons.

"However, according to the 1960 foodgrain production reports collected by the Central Statistics Bureau in January 1960, production fell short of the plan by 300,000 to 400,000 tons; this was reported to the cabinet. (*2)

"Unable to disregard external and internal political problems, the North Korean regime held fast to the exaggerated report of 3.8 million tons. Therefore, at the end of 1961 the North Korean regime simply reported that it had reached its goal of one million tons in increased production without announced total production figures. (*3)

"Since their 1962 foodgrain production target is five million tons, they might announce in January 1963 that they have achieved their goal of five million tons." (*4)[59]

As can be seen both in Ch'oe's testimony and in northern puppet materials since that time, it is important to note that every year the northern puppet food grain production target and production results are the same.

According to the defector Mr Ch'ae Son-kyong (former northern puppet Kaesong district geologic survey member, defected in September 1961), the reason is because "as a general rule, the statistical compilers at each level of the northern puppet administration create and report production results to fit the required target as directed by their superiors."[60]

Also, something to be remembered from Mr Ch'oe Hong-Hui's testimony is that from 300,000 to 400,000 tons of the 3.8 million tons of food grain production announced in 1960 was in excess of their standing grain calculation method, so that it can be estimated to be from 38 to 30 percent greater than their actual harvest. Thus it seems that the communist states' foodgrain production statistics based on their standing grain calculation method, exceed actual harvests by percentages ranging from 20 percent (the Soviet Union's standard variance), through 25 percent (as exposed by Krushchev) and 30 percent (as exposed by Mr Ch'oe for North Korea) to 35 percent (as admitted by the Chinese Communist Party at Lushan).

4. The Falsity of North Korea's "Food Grain Production Statistics"

As analyzed above, when converted to our concept of actual harvests, the North Korean "foodgrain production statistics" concept results in a necessary reduction of 23 percent in the "food grain" concept and a 20-35 percent reduction in the "production" concept for a total reduction of from 43 to 53 percent.

The following is a provisional conversion of the northern puppets' 1976 "food grain production figures" into our "food grain harvest."

Table 16. North Korea's "Food Grain Production Figures" as Actual Harvest (1977)

North Korea's Announced Figures	8 million	8 million	8 million	8 million
Foodgrain	23%(*1)	23%	23%	23%
Standing Grain Calculation Reduction	20%(*2)	25%(*3)	30%(*4)	35%(*5)
Total Reduction	43%	48%	53%	58%
Actual Harvest Conversion Figures	4.56 million (57%)	4.16 million (52%)	3.76 million (47%)	3.36 million (42%)

*1 Husked grain conversion rate for North Korea's food grain

*2 Actual harvest conversion rate for Soviet Union's standing grain calculations

*3 Krushchev's conversion rate

*4 North Korea's conversion rate (per Mr Ch'oe's testimony)

*5 Communist China's conversion rate (Lushan meeting)

Seen within this framework, North Korea's 1977 "food grain production" announced figures of 8 million tons is reduced to a range of from 3.36 million tons to 4.56 million tons when converted to our select grain harvest concept.

Also, when converted according to the rate used for 1960 (53 percent) it becomes 3.76 million tons.

However, due to the makeup by grain type of the food grain and the irregular application of the standing grain calculation method, it is difficult to know where North Korea's 1977 "food grain production's actual harvest figures" would fall on the above scale.

But, it would seem possible to derive something by using the above figures of 3.36 million and 4.56 million tons as the upper and lower limits of North Korea's possible 1977 food grain production and comparing them with similar figures which have been arrived at both domestically and externally both in terms of estimated figures and estimates of North Korea's food grain demand and supply.

Also, it seems that through the above investigation and analysis some degree of understanding of North Korea's view of food has been achieved, even if only quantitatively. However, it doesn't seem that North Korea's food situation can be fully understood without also grasping the North's qualitative and structural concepts.

V. The Heterogenization Trends of North and South Korea's Food Structure and an Evaluation From the Standpoint of Food History

1. Trends Toward Change in the Per Capita Food Consumption Structure in the Korean Peninsula

The following table shows the heterogenization trends between the food views of North and South from the structural side.

Table 17. Trends Toward Change in the Food Consumption Structure in the Korean Peninsula. (%)

Area	Period	Rice	Mixed Grains	Total
Entire Peninsula(*1)	1921-24	30	70	100
Entire Peninsula(*2)	1932-34	25	75	100
ROK (*3)	1975	58.3(120.3kg)	42.7	100
North Korea (*4)	1975	33.0(55.0kg)	67.0	100

Sources: (*1,2) Suzuki Masafumi, "Chosen Keizaino Kendankai" [Current Level of Korea's Economy] p 470 (Korea Main Branch in Keijo of the Imperial Local Government Study Society, 17 Jan 1938)

(*3,4) Hong Ki-ch'ang, "Comparison of North and South..." pp 114-5

As seen in the above table, during the past half-century the rice consumption of the people of the ROK has increased 1.9-2.3 times while North Korea's increase was only 1.1-1.3 times. Therefore, while rice is unquestionably the main grain in the ROK, in North Korea even with the passage of a half-century, mixed grains remain the main grain food.

Furthermore, following liberation North Korea has continuously carried out its system of rationing with differentiation between classes so that now the common people of North Korea must eat between 80 and 100 percent mixed grain.

Table 18. Trends Toward Change in Consumption of Different Grain Types by the People of North and South

Area	Period	First	Second	Third	Fourth	Fifth	Sixth	Seventh
Whole Peninsula(*1)	1932-34	Barley	Rice	Millet	Soy	Corn	Other	
ROK(*2)	1970	Rice	Barley	Wheat	Potato	Soy	Corn	Other
North Korea (*3)	1970's	Oksal (*4)	Wheat Flour					

Sources: (*1) Suzuki, "Chosen Keizai..."

(*2) Hong Ki-ch'ang, "Comparison of North and South..."

(*3) National Reunification Board, "Investigation of the Heterogenization of North Korea," p 224

(*4) Oksal (artificial rice) is made of 80 percent corn meal and 20 percent wheat flour, with a trace of rice. (KITA CHOSEN KENKYU, November 1976, p 34)

As can be seen in the above table, the heterogenization of North and South in the residents' consumption of various types of grains has grown quite severe. As compared to the era of Japanese imperialism, the consumption of rice in the ROK has grown from second to first (for 58.3 percent of the total) while in North Korea corn, which was fifth (5 percent) during the Japanese era, is now first (80 percent).

Therefore, while the main grain in the ROK is rice, in North Korea it has become corn.

Also, rice, which is the main grain in the ROK, is the main grain for high ranking cadre and their families in North Korea, but is said to be as precious as medicine to the common people.[61]

Furthermore, in terms of per capita consumption of all grains per year, in 1975 the ROK was 207.3 kilograms as opposed to 167 kilograms in North Korea, meaning that the per capita consumption of rice in the ROK was 2.2 times that of North Korea.[62]

2. The Consumption of Secondary Foodstuffs in North and South and an Evaluation From the Standpoint of Food History

At the same time, unlike Americans and Europeans, the people of North Korea cannot supplement their diet with milk and secondary foodstuffs (meat, vegetables, fruits, seafoods). The ROK was superior to North Korea in 1975 in per capita calory intake at 2,390 to 2,000.[63]

The 1975 North Korean per capita calory intake is even much less than the 1965 ROK intake of 2,189 calories.[64]

Looking at the trend toward increased consumption of secondary foodstuffs in the ROK during the past 10 years (1965-75), we see a 200 percent increase for daikon (from 3.27 kg to 7.68 kg), 400 percent for Chinese cabbage, 400 percent for red pepper, 200 percent for garlic, 78.3 percent for pears, 1,900 percent for tangerines (during 5 years), 400 percent for pork and 580 percent for milk (during 5 years).[65]

Per capita intake of animal protein in the ROK is 36.4 grams, lower than the U.S. at 65 grams or West Germany at 50 grams, but North Korea has no basis for comparison at all.[66]

In the case of city dwellers among the North Korean residents, vegetables and fruits are distributed, in principle, by the ration system and our traditional kimch'i, toenjang [bean paste] and soy sauce have long since disappeared as far as the common people are concerned. It is said that one kilogram of meat per family is distributed four or five times a year.

Corn oil is used instead of other cooking oils and our traditional sesame seed oil is said to be so scarce that the new generation has never even heard the word.[67]

In summary, if we divide food history into three levels, subsistence, shortages, and increase, currently the ROK is passing from shortages into increase while North Korea is still mired on the subsistence level.[68]

Conclusion

During the last 30 years North Korea's food concept has changed radically from ours. Formally they still use our traditional terminology, but the content of those terms have been adulterated with "socialist" concepts. For example, in diametric opposition to our traditional concept, in food grain production, "food grain" does not mean husked grain but rather coarse grain, and "production" does not mean harvest but rather "standing grain." Also, as a political rather than an economic concept, North Korea's "food grain production statistics" concept is used for external propaganda and internal exploitation.

While this refers to the difference in North Korea's heterogenous quantitative food view, their qualitative view is also very different from ours. That is, while in the ROK rice is the main grain, in North Korea the new word "oksal" (the artificial rice composed of 80 percent corn meal and 20 percent wheat flour and rice flour) is unquestionably the stuff of their diet.

This heterogenization between North and South hinders the unity of domestic and foreign views on the North Korean food situation. That is, North Korea not only shuts off the sources of its own materials, but using craftily created and selected heterogenous terms, statistical methods and food control policies, it deceives and confuses both inside and out by political and psychological warfare while hiding its internal weaknesses at the same time as it controls and exploits the peasants and workers.

The goal of this paper was to bring out some very general problems by comparing North Korea's claims with objective materials regarding such things as "food grain production" in order to establish the facts. In addition, by comparing and examining the various internal and external views on the North Korean food situation according to type, it has shown that the discord among analysts on North Korea's food situation derives from their disregard of or lack of attention to North Korea's heterogenity. We also discovered that this is more true of foreign than of domestic analysts, particularly the U.S. CIA.

Furthermore, this study, by comparatively analyzing North Korea's heterogenous food view which is based on "socialist" concepts with our traditional food view, first reaffirmed that the discord in views of the North Korean food situation stems from North Korea's heterogenity; second it revealed that the North Korean "food grain production statistics" derived in this way are exaggerated; third, the discovery of the exaggeration offered the possibility of an approach to North Korea's actual food production figures; fourth the study showed that these North Korean "food grain production statistics" are basically a means for external deception and internal extortion, and in particular, the analysis by period and type indicated clearly that these statistics form a means for mobilizing the people and mobilizing industrial resources; and fifth, it enabled us to determine that in terms of both quantity and quality, North Korea is behind the ROK by one level when seen from the standpoint of food history.

FOOTNOTES

1. The rice production for the entire Korean Peninsula in 1944 was 16.05 million "som" or 2.293 million tons (Bank of Korea, Research Department, CHOSON KYONGJE YONGAM [1948 Korean Economic Yearbook] pp 111-26) and for the same year, the rice production for the North Korean area was estimated at 0.705 million tons. The source for the 1944 North Korean area rice production: KCNA [Korean Central News Agency], CHOSON CHUNGANG YON'GAM [1958 Korean Central Yearbook], p 196.

2. Population distribution at the time is estimated to have been 68 percent in the South, 32 percent in the North (see Table 1).

3. Source: Korea Development Bank, "History of a Decade..." pp 87-88.

4. From Kil Il-song's 1978 New Year's Address.

5. 2 January 1978 Radio Pyongyang, from National Reunification Board, "January-April 1978 Northern Puppet Materials," p 105.

6. In his talks with the Japanese Diet member Utsunomiya, Kim Il-song said, "Currently our wet paddies total 700,000 hectares, but everybody can eat rice. Corn is used for fodder. Since 300 kilograms of grain per capita is enough, we need 4.5 million tons. With the addition of wheat flour and other grains, we have no problem." (Source: KITA CHOSEN KENKYU, Tokyo, Japan, August 1975, p 7). Also, in an early 1976 interview with the Japanese magazine SEIKAI, Kim Il-song is reported to have stated, "Even giving 300 kilograms of food per person, since our population is 16 million, 4.8 million tons is enough." (Source: The February 1976 edition of the Japanese magazine SEIKAI, 'Notes From a Meeting With Kim Il-song,' as quoted in KITA CHOSEN KENKYU, February 1976, p 32).

7. 3 February 1978 KCNA; National Reunification Board, "January-April 1978 Northern..." pp 105-106.

8. Contents of speech given by Chin Ch'ung-kuk, chief North Korean delegate to the 19th FAO general assembly held 14 November 1977 in Italy (from CHUGAN TAEGONG CHONGBO [Weekly Communist Intelligence].

9. 2 January 1978 Radio P'yongyang, from National Reunification Board, "January-April 1978 Northern..." p 105.

10. Yi defected 6 January 1977 (from North Korea Research Center, PUKHAN, March 1977, p 132; and National Reunification Board, "Current Affairs Intelligence Materials," March 1978, p 15).

11. National Reunification Board, "Current Affairs..." pp 19-20. Verified in a personal interview by author.

12. Korean Central Intelligence Agency, "Weekly Communist Intelligence," 8 December 1976.

13. REUTER/HAPDONG, Bangkok 7 Nov 78, quoted in HANGUK ILBO 8 Nov 78.

14. National Reunification Board, "Pukhan Ijirhwa Silt'ae Chosa" [Investigation of North Korea's Heterogenization] in KUKT'ONG JO, 78-10-1430 p 535.

15. The internal and external views of North Korea's food situation will be examined again in the main body of this study.

16. Source: Report given by Yi Kun-mo (then party economic secretary) at the "Central Report Meeting to Celebrate the 10th Anniversary of the Announcement of the Rural Thesis," from 24 February 1974 Radio Pyongyang.

18. 23 Apr 1964 Moscow, AFP/HAPDONG, in 24 April 1964 HAPTONG NEWS.

19. See 9 August 1977 "Kyonghyang Sinmun" article with a Moscow Roiters byline.

20. 13 January 1974 Central Radio (North Korea), "Text of Kim Il-song's Speech at the Close of the National Agricultural Meeting" convened from 4 to 10 January 1974.

21. In Article 13 of the "Land Law" adopted in April 1977, North Korea decreased the amount of land on which cultivation rights were recognized from 50 p'yong to 20-30 p'yong per family belonging to cooperative farm.

22. Yi Kun-mo, speech at the "Central Report Meeting..." and Kim Il-song, speech at the "National Agricultural..."

23. Testimony common among defectors.

24. Yamada Saburo (Professor at Tokyo University), "Aijia Nogyo no Tonyu Sanshutsu Ko zo to Hatten no Patan 1,) in AJIA NO KEIZAI, 16-6, p 6 (Ajia Keizai Kenkyusho, Tokyo, Japan).

25. 11 April 1976 Radio Pyongyang report on "Plenary Session of the North Hamgyong Province Committee of the KWP."

26. Source: 12 July 1976 "Central Radio" (Pyongyang) and other KCIA materials.

27. 4 April 1977 Radio Pyongyang broadcast and 17 April NODONG SINMUN noted that "precipitation is continuing to decrease and the temperature needed for the growth of crops is falling" while emphasizing that the "whole party, whole military and whole people" be mobilized to develop underground water resources.

28. Special materials.

29. 2 and 3 February 1978 KCNA reports.

30. ILBON MUYOK CHINHUNG TONGGYE POGO [Japan Trade Promotion Statistics Report] (Dateline Tokyo, Orient Press) KYONGHYANG SINMUN 26 October 1976 'Northern puppets' 3 year trade deficit, 1.3 billion dollars.'

31. Although this information post-dates the preparation of this study, the head of the Agriculture Committee of the State Administration Council, So Kwan-hui announced at the 11 January 1979 "National Agriculture Functionaries Meeting" that the 8.8 million-ton grain production goal originally set for 1978 had been changed to 1979. Radio Pyongyang 12 January 1979.

32. According to the Japan Trade Promotion Statistics, North Korea's trade deficit was 319.9 million dollars in 1973, 646.5 million in 1974 and 409.6 million dollars in 1975. (26 October 1976 TONGA ILBO) Also, what is the significance of the talk that Communist China is giving North Korea food aid? SANKEI SIMBUN (Japan) 2 April 1977.

33. Radio Pyongyang 16 January 1975.

34. KITA CHOSEN KENKYU, August 1975, p 7.

35. It is common sense for each country to stockpile emergency foodstuffs. There is no way of knowing how much food North Korea has stockpiled, but they have both the "President's Reserve Foodstuffs" and the "Cabinet's Reserve Foodstuffs"; the former is probably for super-emergency use and the latter for normal emergency use. (KITA CHOSEN KENKYU, March 1977 p 52).

36. Testimony of defectors Yi Hong-bo and Yi Sok-mo, from "Current Affairs..." March 1978, p 19 (National Reunification Board).

37. Sources: (*1) is from "Weekly Communist Intelligence," 1 April 1978, (*2) ibid.

38. Source: Special materials.

39. North Korea's HYONDAI CHOSONMAL SAJON [Modern Korean Language Dictionary], pp 1197-98 (Academy of Social Sciences, Pyongyang, 9 September 1968).

40. See Kim Il-song's 25 February 1964 'Thesis on Our Country's Rural Areas' in KWP, publisher, Kim Il-song Sonjip [Kim Il-song Selected Works], Pyongyang, 15 August 1968. Also see materials relating to 25 February 1964 4/8 Plenary Session of the KWP.

41. KITA CHOSEN KENKYU, March 1977, p 32.

42. KITA CHOSEN KENKYU, October 1976, p 37, November 1976, p 31, and February 1977, p 65. These articles show mistrust of North Korea.

43. Central Intelligence Agency National Foreign Assessment Center, Korea: The Economic Race Between the North and the South, January 1978 (from the section "Aggregate Comparisons").

44. This is the exact opposite of Professor Yamada Saburo's analysis appearing in the following "C".

45. The "Agricultural and Rural Development" section of the op cit U.S. CIA report.

46. KITA CHOSEN KENKYU, November 1976, pp 31-32, the article entitled 'Improving and Strengthening the State's Economic Statistics Work.'

47. Yamada Sanro, AIJIA NOGYO..." p 62.

48. Yamada Sanro, AIJIA NO KEIZAI..." p 66.

49. The fabrication of the 1960 and 1961 foodgrain production statistics will be analyzed again later.

50. North Korean "Central Yearbook" (1958), p 196.

51. Reaffirmed by Mr Kim Yong-kyu (former KWP assistant department chief who defected in September 1976).

52. Cabinet Research Office, SOVIETTO NENKAN [Soviet Annual] vol 2, p 158 ("Furonchifu's [phonetic] New Development Policy" Tokyo, Japan, 1955.

53. Bank of Korea, "Korean Economic Yearbook," 1948, pp 111-18.(*1) Toitsu chosen simbunsha, TOITSU CHOSEN NENKAN [Unified Korea Yearbook], 1965-68 edition, Tokyo, p 801.

54. "Soviet Annual" (1955 edition), p 154.

55. 16 January 1975 Central Radio, from "The Speech Given by Kim Il-song at the National Agricultural Meeting."

56. "Soviet Annual," p 150. Citing that "it is common sense to interpret Soviet Union statistical figures with a 20 percent reduction under the standing grain calculation to reach the true harvest," the source says that such an agricultural product statistical method came into use in the Soviet Union following 1933 (completion of the collective farm system).

57. Radio Pyongyang 16 December 1958. See the "Soviet Annual," pp 27, 150, 153, and 157 for related materials.

58. TONGHWA T'ONGSIN [Tonghwa News] vol 4, 27 August (26 August AFP/ Tonghwa Peking byline).

59. In Mr Ch'oe's testimony, (*1) should read Party Central Committee, not Party Congress. (23 December 1960). The reading of Party Congress must have been a slip either by Ch'oe or by the recorder. Items discussed at that meeting were "1. Summary of the 1960 Rural Economy and Work for 1961" and "2. The 1961 Plan for the Development of the people's economy." (see National Reunification Board, "North Korean Materials Collection," 1978, p 197.).

(*2) Here the 1960 actual production report would be one based on the "standing grain calculation method." This is because they had already applied the Soviet Union's "standing grain calculation method."

(*3) Mr Ch'oe says that in 1961 the northern puppets only propagandized about their one million ton foodgrain production increase plan, but in the 1962 edition of the KOREAN CENTRAL YEARBOOK on p 252 they announced their grain production at 4.83 million tons. At that time Ch'oe was probably undergoing secret training.

(*4) As predicted by Mr Ch'oe, the North Korean's announced that they had reached their foodgrain production target of 5 million tons in 1962. (See the op cit statistics by year).

60. Army Headquarters Operations Staff, publishers, T'ONGIL [Reunification] volume 153, 1961. Although Ch'ae was 27 at the time, he virtually spent all of his time on trips into the provinces as a geologic survey member so that he was well acquainted with the North Korean situation (particularly the rural situation).

61. It is told that when asked by North Korean dock workers at Ch'ongjin and Namp'o ports to "lend me some rice so I can feed rice gruel to my sick child," the Japanese sailors gave the dock workers about one toe, but the Koreans only took about two hop, saying that if they got caught it would be big trouble, and while hiding the rice in their waistbands said, "Rice is like medicine to us." (Materials: See the "Weekly Communist Intelligence," volume 645 and the 3 January 1977 KYONGHYANG SINMUN article, "Rice Is Medicine to the People of North Korea."

62. Hong Ki-ch'ang, "Comparison of North and South..." pp 114-15.

63. KYONGHYANG SINMUN 31 Jan 1977.

64. HANKOK ILBO 19 February 1978, "Changes in Diet Lifestyle."

65. ibid.

66. Democratic Republican Party, 1986 SONJIN HANGUK [Korea as an Advanced Nation in 1986], p 211, Seoul, 25 May 1978.

67. See NAE-OE T'ONGSIN 2 August 1978 (Testimony of O I-sop, defecting fisherman) and the 23 August 1978 T'ONGIL ILBO, 'Hard-to-get Cooking Oil.'

68. See the above "Korea as an Advanced...," p 120 re the stage of food history.

9137
CSO: 4108

NORTH KOREA STRIVES TO INCREASE CEMENT PRODUCTION

Pyongyang THE FOREIGN TRADE in English Dec 79 pp 2-7

[Article: "Korea is One of the Biggest Cement Exporters in the World"]

[Excerpts] In 1978 the production of cement was boosted to 132 percent compared with the previous year and in the first half of this year it rose again to 135 percent as against the corresponding period of last year.

Today, we turn out only in 6 days as much cement as was produced in one year after the liberation.

Our country turns out acid-proof cement, expansion cement, quick-setting cement, coloured cement, high-strength cement, alumina cement, sea-water proof cement and other quality cement to be used in many fields of economy.

Numerous cement factories including the Haeju Cement Factory and the February 8 Cement Factory adopted industrial television. And their production processes are now on the stage of turning into a comprehensive automation from partial one.

The Sunchon Cement Factory is a factory where were introduced the latest science and technology including electronic computers, automatic analysers and flotation preheating burning method. All the production processes of this factory were comprehensively automated.

Our country makes rapid progress not only in the production of cement but also its export. Particularly, we increase sharply its export in recent years.

In 1978 as against 1977 the export ran up to 206 percent and this year it jumped up to 883 percent.

Today our country has come to take the top place in the world in the absolute export amount of cement.

The buyers of our cement, too, have grown to more than 40 countries in Asia, Europe and Africa.

Such a rapid increase of the export of cement is not caused by cutting our domestic consumption.

Recently alone, we constructed expressways from Pyongyang to Wonsan and from Pyongyang to Nampo, carried out more than 2940 industrial constructions and completed numerous building constructions including over 600 counterflow pumping stations.

This year we have pushed forward construction work of many factories and enterprises including the Taedonggang Power Station, the Taean Heavy Machine Combine, dwelling houses whose number is 1.3 times more than last year and large-scale cultural, public health and social welfare facilities.

This indicates that our country sharply increases the export of cement while fully meeting a large amount of home demand for it.

That is why many foreign guests visiting our country said: "While carrying on enormous construction projects, Korea exports so much cement. This demonstrates its economic power and the might of its cement industry," and "Korea is one of the biggest cement exporters in the world."

The quality of our cement enjoys world recognition.

Many authoritative trade organizations of the world including the P.W.D. Materials Testing Laboratory, Hong Kong, repeatedly published that the Korean cement fully complied with B.S.S. 12:1978.

Thus, the demand for our cement is on the continuous increase.

In recent years alone, not a few countries expressed their desire to import more than one million tons of cement. A certain country hoped to import 4 million tons of our cement every year.

Just at this time Korea is striving for attaining its goal of 12-13 million tons of cement in the new prospective plan.

This figure shows that our country will surpass the developed countries in the per capita output of cement.

We have all conditions and possibilities of reaching the goal in the next few years.

Our country is, above all, favoured with inexhaustible resources of raw materials such as high-quality limestone and argillite. They are our big assets.

With a huge state investment, pit construction and the capital construction for large-scale stopes are extensively going on at mines.

The cement industry is bringing about a radical change in its phase from day to day under the active support of chuche-oriented industry.

The Komusan Cement Factory, the Sunghori Cement Factory and the February 8 Cement Factory were additionally equipped with large-sized kilns and new large-scale cement factories are under construction.

We built an automated cement factory with a capacity of 3 million tons only in two years and creditably manage and operate it by ourselves.

New techniques including a flotation preheating burning method are widely introduced by the workers and technicians possessing the latest scientific knowledge and technology and the capacity of existent rotary kilns has gone up 1.5 times in recent years.

Thus, the assignment of cement production for the first two years of the new prospective plan has been overfulfilled considerably.

Along the road of chuche-orientation, modernization and scientification of the national economy our cement industry is ceaselessly making innovations.

In keeping with the rapid growth of cement production shipping equipment, storage facilities and transporting facilities are being actively modernized to augment the export of cement.

Large-sized silos, large-sized long-distance belt-conveyers and conveying pipelines were built at ports. The production of goods wagons specially-designed for transporting cement is on the increase and the preparations for shipping cement in a fastened state are made thoroughly.

All these facts tell that the prospect of cement export is very optimistic.

CSO: 4120

DPRK PRODUCES VARIETY OF FARM MACHINERY, EXPORTS INCREASING

Pyongyang THE FOREIGN TRADE in English Dec 79 pp 8, 9

[Excerpts] The DPRK has powerful production centres of farm machines. Our up-to-date production centres of farm machines are producing and supplying varieties of farm machines of high efficiency necessary for the comprehensive mechanization of rural economy.

In 1976 the production of tractors was 8.7 times greater than that of 1970.

Last year, the first year of the Second Seven-Year Plan, the production of tractors increased by 16 percent compared with the previous year and the first half of this year by 20 percent as against the same period of last year.

This has enabled us to make great progress in the comprehensive mechanization of rural economy.

It is reported that during the period from 1961 to 1975 the number of tractors per 100 hectares of cultivated land showed only an increase of 0.2 in the developed capitalist countries whereas the number of tractors of our country used in the rural economy has grown more than four times for the past 10 years since 1964. Thus, in 1974 our country already reached the level of the advanced countries in the number of tractors per 100 hectares of cultivated land. In the near future we will have 10 tractors per 100 hectares of cultivated land.

We have not only rapidly increased the production of tractors but also diversified their kinds.

The Kumsong Tractor Factory, the September 25 Tractor Factory and many other tractor factories are producing diverse tractors such as large-, medium- and small-sized tractors, caterpillar and wheel tractors, tractors for hill-side land and paddy fields. This means that our country is producing all kinds of tractors available in all topographical conditions, that is, in the flat, intermediate and mountainous areas.

We are exporting tractors, the number of which has increased by 3 times in recent years.

Great efforts have been also made to mechanize rice cultivation which is the main farming of our country.

Accordingly, the production bases of efficient farm machines necessary for mechanizing rice culture have been reliably established.

In 1974 the productive capacity of rice-seedling transplanters was already tens of thousands.

As the production of rice-seedling transplanters is increasing every year, transplanting of rice seedlings has become mechanized. This machine was designed to be effectively used for weeding, chemicals-spraying and other farming work along with transplanting of rice-seedlings. Our rice-seedling transplanters win great popularity for their excellent performance, that is, they do not miss transplanting of rice-seedlings, but fully ensure the proper number of every plant in transplanting.

Our rice-seedling transplanters are exported with high reputation to many countries in Southeast Asia where rice cultivation is their main farming.

Of late, we have started producing new rice-seedling transplanters fitted for the farming in some countries with the result that the demand for them is further swelled.

The newly-designed transplanters are capable of transplanting rice-seedlings in the paddy fields whose depth of water is more than 40 centimetres and of correctly transplanting one big plant or more plants in the paddy fields.

Recently, we are also producing small-sized rice-seedling transplanters with the capacity of 50 pyong (One pyong is equal to about 3.952 sq. yd.) per hour which are very convenient for transplanting rice-seedlings in the terraced or small paddy fields or in the corner of the fields.

We are also turning out high-efficient rice-seedling pullers which can pull rice-seedlings in 30 pyong per hour.

In this way, we realized the mechanization of pulling rice-seedlings which had been one of the most difficult questions in the comprehensive mechanization of rural economy.

The rice-seedling pullers are included in the list of export machines of our country and their export will be boosted.

Besides, our country produces various other farm machines such as machines for ploughing, harrowing, sowing, manuring, weeding, chemicals-spraying, sprinkling water, harvesting, threshing and transportation.

Our farm machines, which are simple in operation and can be used easily under various topographical conditions, draw interest abroad and the demand for them is increasing daily.

In the new prospective plan period our country plans to increase the export of a variety of farm machines and implements including plows, harrows, air seeders, rotary weeders, sprinklers, sprayers, combine-harvesters, combine-thrashers, hydraulic loading and unloading machines, fruit-picking machines, silk-raising machines and feed mills.

CSO: 4120

N. KOREA/ECONOMY

BRIEFS

RICE PRODUCTION--Last year our agricultural working people did farming well as required by the chuche-based farming method in spite of the abnormal weather conditions. All crops bore a rich harvest. This was the biggest harvest in the history of our country. Eight to nine tons of rice were generally produced per hectare. There were lots of state farms and cooperative farms which yielded more than 12 or 13 tons of rice per hectare. Unprecedented bumper crops in our rural economy enabled our country to have food reserves in larger quantities. Accordingly, the prospect of rice export is quite optimistic. New rice variety widely cultivated in the fields of our country is good in quality. A large amount of Korean rice is exported to overseas markets and their order is on the increase. The Korea Foodstuffs Export and Import Corporation exports round or oval rice according to buyer's demand. [Excerpts] [Pyongyang FOREIGN TRADE in English Feb 80 p 29]

3 APRIL MACHINE FACTORY--The factory produces various machine tools such as numerically-controlled automatic lathe model "Kusong-1," center lathe model "Kusong-2," center lathe model "Kusong-3" and center lathe model "Sonl-315," gear-hobbing machine model "Zl-10," gear shaping machine model "Z2-4," gear shaping machine model "Z2-6" and vertical drilling machine model "Bol-10-32." The universal center lathe model "Kusong-3" was awarded a gold medal at the 1971 Plovdiv International Fair in Bulgaria. A member of the Friendship Delegation of the Kingdom of Thailand who visited our country last year showed interest in our center lathe model "Sl-250." Last year the factory achieved great successes in increasing the variety of machine tools and enhancing their quality, for example, the center lathe model "Kusong-3 Ka" and vertical drilling machines. Last year the factory made various up-to-date lathes including center lathe model "Sonl0-315x800 Ka" which is now in serial production. This machine guarantees high productivity, high precision in processing and reliability in operation. This year we will export it on a big scale. [Excerpts] [Pyongyang FOREIGN TRADE in English Jan 80 pp 6, 7]

CSO: 4120

PRESIDENT OF EXPORT-IMPORT FIRM SAYS 'FOREIGN TRADE WILL INCREASE'

Pyongyang FOREIGN TRADE in English Feb 80 p 32

[Article: "Foreign Trade Transaction Will Be Further Enlarged"]

[Text] Our corporation enlarges every year the scope of business transaction with trade organs of many countries of the world.

Last year we had trade transaction with our customers whose number was increased by 13 as against the previous year. This means that our customers are 26 times in number compared with those in the year when we initiated foreign trade.

We appreciate this opportunity to extend our greetings to the companies of many countries which are developing the trade relations with us on the principle of equality and mutual benefit.

As is generally known, our corporation exports in large quantities machine tools, rolling equipment, tools, bearings, etc.

Today our corporation exports scores of kinds of machine tools and cutting tools, of which the kind of machine tools amounts to nearly 20.

Among them are machine tool model "Kusong-3" which obtained a gold medal at international market, high-speed universal centre lathes model "S1-200" and "S1-250", milling machine model "F1-250", radial drilling machine model "B2-40", vertical drilling machine, surface grinding machine model "M3-300" and gear shaping machine model "Z2-4" which are in great demand.

Cutting tools of different kinds also received gold medals at international markets for their good materials and high efficiency.

We export these products in great quantity to 80-odd companies of over 50 countries every year.

The trading business of our corporation will be bright this year, too.

Under the wise guidance of the great leader President Kim Il Sung, the annual output of engineering products will reach 5 million tons in the next few years. Great stress will be also placed on the production of machine tools and in 1984 their output will reach 50,000. In particular, the production of heavy, special, semi-automatic, automatic and single-purpose machine tools will be noticeably increased in the long-term plan period.

This offers us a promising prospect to further expand foreign trade.

Last year our research institute of machine tools newly designed various new modern machine tools of which lathes model "S1-250 Ka", "Kusong-3 Ka" and "Son 10-315x800 Ka" and vertical milling machine model "F 12-250 Ka" were in serial production.

They are of unique characteristics of up-to-date machine tools.

The corporation includes these new machines in export items this year.

Thus, the corporation will increase the export of machine tools, cutting tools and other machine products markedly this year compared with last year.

Lathes with machining length of 300-1000 mm, presses of 60 and 100 tons, tube manufacturing equipment and cylindrical grinders will hold a greater proportion in our export machinery this year.

The export of heavy and special machine tools will be noticeably increased, too.

There will be a variety of methods in foreign trade transaction this year, that is, in trade various methods such as the barter of machinery, direct sales, technical services and demonstration will be applied.

While increasing the export of machine tools and cutting tools on a large scale, our corporation will import a large quantity of various machine equipment.

It is hoped that those who wish to have transaction with us will address their inquiries to:

KOREA FIRST MACHINERY EXPORT AND IMPORT CORPORATION
Central District, Pyongyang, D.P.R.K.
Cable add.: "ILGIGYE" Pyongyang
Telex: 5354 KP

Ryu Yong Min, President of the Korea First Machinery Export and Import Corporation

CSO: 4120

BRIEFS

DPRK-MALAYSIA TRADE AGREEMENT--Kuala Lumpur, Feb 22--Malaysia and North Korea ratified Thursday trade agreement at the foreign ministry here. The ratification put into effect the agreement signed in Pyongyang last year by Malaysia's Deputy Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir Mohamad and his North Korean counterpart, Kong Jim Tae. The secretary-general of the foreign ministry, Tam Sri Zakaria Ali, signed the ratification documents for Malaysia, while the North Korean ambassador, Ho Kyong, signed for his country. The agreement provides for the export by North Korea of 49 items, including various types of machinery, steel, textiles, fertilizers, cement, grains and silk. Malaysia has offered 48 items for export, including wood and rubber products, marine products, beverages, furniture, pewterware, electrical equipment, handicraft, timber and palm oil. [Text] [Manila PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 23 Feb 80 p 10]

CSO: 4120

N. KOREA/BIOGRAPHICS

BACKGROUND OF KIM KYONG-YON REPORTED

Seoul VANTAGE POINT in English Vol 3 No 2, Feb 80 pp 19-20

[Text] Kim Kyong-yon finance minister for 10 years since 1971, was promoted to a deputy premier in the early part of January filling the post vacated by the late No Tae-sok, who died in an accident on December 31. Kim's promotion was bared on January 10 when north Korean broadcasts reported the departure of an economic mission led by Deputy Premier Kong Chin-tae for Iran on January 9. Kim was at the airport to send off the mission. It was not made available whether he concurrently holds the post of finance minister or who took the chairmanship of the State Planning Commission which had been concurrently held by the late Ro.

Born on September 1, 1925 in North Hamgyong Province, Kim studied at Moscow University majoring in 1949 in finance. He was the chief of the economics department at the People's Economic College from the early 1950s to 1961 when he entered on government service; he was named chief of the planning department of the State Planning Commission. Since then he has worked in finance-related posts in the government. He has held such important posts as the deputy chief of the department of finance in the Party Central Committee, chief of the general department of external economic affairs in the cabinet and the chairman of the External Economic Commission (formerly the general department of external economic affairs). He was named finance minister on June 25, 1971. Leading economic missions he has visited many countries, including Indonesia, Iran, South Yemen, Somalia, Tanzania, Zambia, Cuba, Guinea, and East Germany from 1963 on.

He was admitted to the party Central Committee at the fifth party Congress in November 1970. As a member of the Supreme People's Assembly, he ranks 97th in the PCC. In 1971 he was named chairman of the (north) Korea-China Friendship Association and the (north) Korea-Syria Friendship Association.

With Kim's promotion to the deputy premiership, the number of economy-related deputy premiers continues to be six, two-thirds of the total. They are Kye Ung-tae, Kong Chin-tae, Kang Song-san, Choe Chae-u, Kim Tu-yong and Kim Kyong-yon.

CSO: 4120

N. KOREA/CHRONOLOGY

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS IN JANUARY 1980

Seoul VANTAGE POINT in English Vol 3 No 2, Feb 80 pp 27-32

[Text]

1 President Kim Il-sung delivers the New Year message.

1 President Kim sends a New Year greeting message to the chairman of Chochongnyon, the pro-Pyongyang federation of Korean residents in Japan, and receives a reply from him.

1 Radio Pyongyang reports north Korea sent an educational subsidy of 420 million yen in Japanese currency to Chochongnyon. The total sum of such money sent to the federation on 74 occasions reach 27,832,827,033 yen.

1 President Kim views the new year performance of the People's Army concert troupe along with Party and government luminaries.

3 The state funeral for the late Deputy Premier Ro Tae-sok (로 태 석) is held in Pyongyang.

3 Workers at Hichon Machinery Plant hold a rally and pledge to greet the sixth Party Congress with high political esteem and economic achievements. They initiated the "Socialist competition" drive to mark the occasion.

3 Premier Lee Jong-ok (리 종 옥) receives a condolence message from Chinese Premier Hua Guofeng over the death of Deputy Premier Ro Tae-sok.

3 President Kim cables a congratulatory message to Burmese President Ne Win on the occasion of the 32nd anniversary of the country's independence.

4 The (north) Korean Central Broadcasting Station (KCBS) and Radio Pyongyang report Ambassador Kim Ung-su (김 웅 수) to Liberia paid a farewell call on the Liberian head of state on December 28.

4 The new Norwegian ambassador arrives in Pyongyang to take up his post.

4 KCBS and Radio Pyongyang report various factories and enterprises are holding rallies to resolve to "greet the coming sixth Party Congress with high political esteem and economic achievements."

5 Ambassador Kim Jin-gi (김 진 기) to Gabon pays a farewell call on President Bongo.

5 A Party and government mission led by Deputy Premier Chong Jun-gi (정 준 기) leaves for Iraq.

5 President Kim cables a congratulatory message to Burundi President Jean Baptiste Bagaza upon his election as chairman of the Burundi Nationalist Unification Progressive Party.

6 President Kim cables a congratulatory message to Togo President Gnassingbe Eyadema upon his reelection.

7 A Party mission led by Deputy Premier Kong Jin-tae (공 진 태) returns home from a visit to Burundi.

7 A Bulgarian children's art troupe arrives in Pyongyang for a 16-day visit.

8 President Kim receives credentials from the new Norwegian ambassador in Pyongyang.

8 An Equatorial Guinea government mission led by a member of the Supreme Military Commission arrives in Pyongyang for a two-day visit.

8 About 1,000 enthusiasts of Chochongnyon hold a rally in Tokyo to talk on their programs for 1980.

9 President Kim meets with an Equatorial Guinea government mission.

9 An economic mission led by Deputy Premier Kong Jin-tae leaves for Iran. (The mission returned on January 19.)

10 The four-day third convention of the (north) Korean Writers League closes in Pyongyang.

10 The Egyptian vice president and his entourage arrive in Pyongyang for a four-day visit.

10 North Korea and the Soviet Union conclude a protocol at the end of the 10th joint fishing committee meeting held in Moscow. The protocol concerns fishing cooperation between the two countries for 1980.

11 The (north) Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), on behalf of the higher authorities, reports that the Pyongyang-Seoul hotline should be restored and that the north side hopes the south answer the direct telephone at 6 p.m. on January 11.

11 KCNA at 11:11 p.m. proposes south Korea dispatch relevant officials to the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at 2 p.m. on January 12 in the truce village of Panmunjom and receive from two north Korean liaison officials "letters containing important proposals on unification."

11 President Kim cables a congratulatory message to Syrian President Hafez al-Assad upon the latter's reelection as general secretary of the Arab Socialist Reconstruction Party.

11 Vice President Pak Song-chol (박 성 철) holds talks with the visiting Egyptian vice president in Pyongyang.

12 KCBS reports Premier Lee Jong-ok sent a letter to south Korean Premier Shin Hyon-hwack proposing an earliest possible contact between them. Vice President Kim Il (김 일) also sent letters to 11 leading south Koreans representing the political, social, religious and military fields.

12 Chochongnyon holds an educational workers' rally to extend their gratitude for the 74th "education subsidy" from north Korea.

12 President Kim meets with the Egyptian vice president and his mission and gives them luncheon.

14 A fishery mission returns home from a visit to the Soviet Union.

14 North Korea and Iran conclude a prototocol on the exchange of goods for 1980 in Tehran.

15 A health mission led by Health Minister Pak Myong-bin (박 명 빈) leaves on a visit to Bulgaria and Poland.

15 The new Togo ambassador arrives in Pyongyang to take up his post.

15 A Yugoslav cultural mission arrives in Pyongyang for an eight-day visit.

16 Chon Yong-un (전 영 운) is named ambassador to Gabon.

16 President Kim cables a message to Yugoslavia President Josip Broz Tito wishing for his early recovery from the surgery.

17 Oh Sung-hwan (오 승 환) is named ambassador to Nicargaua and Choe Ung-myong (최 응 명) to North Yemen.

18 The Central Committee of the (north) Korean Workers' Party cables a congratulatory message to the chairman of the Denmark Communist Party upon his sixtieth birthday.

18 Deputy Premier Kong Jin-tae meets with a Soviet deputy premier in Moscow. (Kong was in Moscow after his visit to Iran.)

19 Moscow Radio reports physicians from 11 Socialist countries including north Korea attended a science meeting from January 8 to 10 at a nuclear institute near Moscow to discuss the scientific projects for the coming five years.

19 The spokesman of the (north) Korean Sports Guidance Committee issues a statement asking the Seoul side dispatch approapriate liaison officials to Panmunjom to meet the two northern officials carrying a letter containing the proposal concerning the formation of a single Korean team for the Moscow Olympics.

19 Vice President Kim Il and Premier Lee Jong-ok meet with the Bulgarian children's art troupe and later view their performance.

21 The 10 day competition in speed skating and ice hockey championships for 1980 close in Hyesan and Pujon, respectively.

21 KCBS and Radio Pyongyang report the north Korean sports liaison officials delivered a letter to their south Korean counterparts. The north side proposes a preliminary meeting be held on February 1 at Panmunjom to talk on the formation of a single Korean team for the Moscow Olympics.

21 President Kim receives credentials from the new Togo ambassador in Pyongyang.

21 A central reporting meet to commemorate the 55th anniversary of the "1,000 ri journey of liberation" by Kim Il sung is held in Pyongyang.

22 The four-day 18th plenary session of the Central Committee of the General Federation of Trade Unions closes in Pyongyang after discussing the role of the federation members in greeting the sixth Party Congress "with high political esteem and economic achievements."

22 A six day speed skating and ice hockey contest for students closes in Hoeryong County participated in by 800 students from universities, colleges, senior middle schools and elementary schools. The event was held to commemorate the 30th founding anniversary of the Socialist Working Youth.

22 KCBS and Radio Pyongyang report vice President Kim Il sent letters to 10 leading Korean residents in foreign countries "in order to realize south-north talks and push for a peaceful unification."

22 Moscow Radio reports the Taean Heavy Machinery Plant, the biggest such ever built in north Korea, is going to start operation this year.

22 Student chairmen of the Socialist Working Youth branches in senior middle schools embark on a march after holding a ceremony at Popyong, Chagang Province to commemorate the "1,000-ri journey of liberation by great leader Marshal Kim Il-sung in 1925 at the age of 14."

22 A Kim Il-sung University mission led by its first vice president, Chi Chang-ik (지 창 익), leaves on a visit to the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

22 Athletes from Chochongnyon arrives in Pyongyang.

23 Rodong Shinmun, organ of the Workers' Party, publishes a commentary on the first anniversary of the promulgation of the four-point (unification) proposal by the Democratic Front for the Reunification of the Fatherland. Secretary General Ho Jong-suk (허 정 숙) of the front also issues a statement on the occasion.

23 A Socialist Working Youth mission led by its vice chairman, Kim Chang-ryong (김 창 룡), leaves for Iraq.

23 North Korea and Bulgaria conclude an agreement on health, medical and scientific cooperation between the two countries in Sofia. Also, an agreement between the health ministries of the two countries for 1980-1981 is signed.

24 Moscow Radio reports a north Korean mission joined in the commemoration of the 225th founding anniversary of Moscow University on January 23. The mission is headed by Chi Chang-ik.

24 Moscow Radio reports north Korean delegates attended the preliminary committee meeting of the Olympic Games for 1980 along with other Socialist country delegations. Chong Jong-u (정 정 [illegible]), international relations department chief of the (north) Korean Sports Guidance Committee, led the mission.

25 Secretary General Pak Se-chan (박 [illegible] [illegible]) of the International Trade Promotion Committee issues a statement retorting the "current false reports" that north Korea reexports imported crude oil to other countries.

25 President Kim cables a congratulatory message to the Indian President Neelam Sanjiva Reddy upon the 30th founding anniversary of the republic.

26 KCBS and Radio Pyongyang report a north Korean patrol boat has seized two unidentified ships off the West Coast at 10:29 a.m.

26 The Central Committee of the (north) Korean Workers' Party cables a congratulatory message to the third convention of the Sudanese Socialist League.

26 A commemoration ceremony for the 25th founding anniversary of the (north) Korean Scientific-Educational Film Studio is held in Pyongyang.

26 The (north) Korea-China Yalu River Hydroelectric Company concludes an agreement after its 32nd regular conference in Peking.

27 Ambassador Son Yong-sun (손 영 순) to Guinea meets with Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia during the latter's visit to Guinea.

27 A 14,000-ton freighter, Kwanmobong-ho, is launched at Chongjin Dockyard.

28 A Polisario mission led by the vice general secretary of the front arrives in Pyongyang.

29 Peking Radio reports the 19th conference of the China-(North) Korea Border River Transport Cooperation Committee was held recently in Shenyang and the two delegations on January 28 signed an agreement after the conference.

29 A Chochongnyon mission led by its deputy chairman, Sin Sang-dae (신 상 대), leaves Pyongyang winding up its 48-day visit to north Korea. The mission came to extend the federation's gratitude to Pyongyang on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the commencement of repatriation of Korean residents in Japan to north Korea.

29 A trade mission led by Deputy Trade Minister Pang Tae-yul (방 태 율) leaves for Hungary.

29 A delegation of the North Korea-China Yalu River Hydroelectric Company

returns home from China after taking part in the 32nd regular conference of directors.

29 The two-day 21st plenary session of the Socialist Working Youth Central Committee closes in Pyongyang after discussing the role of youths for the coming sixth Party Congress. They adopted a resolution to stage a "loyalty gift drive" among youths.

29 Deputy Premier Chong Jun-gi and his mission pay a call on President Mobutu Sese Seko during a visit to Zaire.

30 KCBS and Radio Pyongyang report Deputy Premier Chong Jun-gi and his mission visited Ethiopia from January 18 to 22.

30 KCBS and Radio Pyongyang disclose the content of the letter Premier Lee sent to south Korean Premier Shin Hyon-hwack, which said that north Korea will dispatch five delegates to Panmunjom at 10 a.m. February 6 for the preliminary meeting for the proposed premiers' talks.

30 President Kim cables a congratulatory message to Somalia President Mohammed Siad Barre on his reelection as presidenct.

31 The two-day 15th plenary session of the Agricultural Workers' League Central Committee closes in Pyongyang after discussing the role of farming workers in attaining the 9.5-million-ton grain production goal this year.

31 President Kim cables a congratulatory message to Bani-Sadr on his election as Iranian president.

31 The Iraqi ambassador in Pyongyang hosts a banquet to commemorate the 12th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between north Korea and Iraq.

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SOUTH AND EAST ASIA REPORT
VIETNAM REPORT

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WORLDWIDE REPORT: Environmental Quality
WORLDWIDE REPORT: Epidemiology
WORLDWIDE REPORT: Law of the Sea
WORLDWIDE REPORT: Nuclear Development and Proliferation
WORLDWIDE REPORT: Telecommunications Policy, Research and Development